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BETTER BOUNTY HUNTING:
HOW THE SEC'S NEW WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM CHANGES THE SECURITIES FRAUD
CLASS ACTION DEBATE
Amanda M Rose
ABSTRACT-The SEC's new whistleblower bounty program has provoked
significant controversy. That controversy has centered on the failure of the
implementing rules to make internal reporting through corporate
compliance departments a prerequisite to recovery. This Article approaches
the new program with a broader lens, examining its impact on the
longstanding debate over fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) class actions. The
Article demonstrates how the bounty program, if successful, will replicate
the fraud deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions while simultaneously
increasing the costs of such suits-rendering them a pointless yet
expensive redundancy. If instead the SEC proves incapable of effectively
administering the bounty program, the Article shows how amending it to
include a qui tam provision for Rule 1Ob-5 violations would offer several
advantages over retaining FOTM class actions. Either way, the bounty
program has important and previously unrecognized implications that
policymakers should not ignore.
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INTRODUCTION
"Fraud-on-the-market" (FOTM) securities class actions have been
under sustained attack.' Congress dealt them a major blow by enacting the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),2 and the courts
have been whittling away at them for decades. Last year, four Supreme
Court Justices went so far as to suggest it is time to reconsider Basic v.
Levinson, the case that gave FOTM class actions life,4 and the Court has
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (2013). As described more fully in Part I, a fraud-on-the-market class
action alleges that corporate misstatements or omissions inflated the price at which dispersed public
shareholders purchased stock on the secondary market, and seeks out-of-pocket damages on behalf of
the class based on losses sustained when the truth was revealed. The suit may be brought despite the
lack of actual reliance on the part of the class members due to judicially recognized presumptions of
reliance. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972).
2 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
3 See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
4 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring) ("[R]econsideration of the Basic presumption may be appropriate."); id. at 1208 n.4
(Thomas, J., joined by Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) ("The Basic decision itself is questionable.").
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since granted certiorari in a case that presents it with such an opportunity.
Scholars, for their part, have grown increasingly critical of FOTM class6actions. None seriously defend them as a compensatory tool, and many
question their deterrence benefits. But professors are cautious types, and
academic proposals to eliminate the FOTM class action have tended to be
conditional on concurrent changes to the U.S. securities fraud enforcement
regime-changes that would compensate for any loss in deterrence that
might result from their elimination.
This Article demonstrates that the new Whistleblower Bounty
Program (WBP) created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act is the proverbial nail in the FOTM class action
coffin. The WBP mandates that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) pay significant financial rewards to eligible individuals who
voluntarily provide the agency with original information about securities
law violations if that information leads to an enforcement action resulting
in $1 million or more in sanctions. The program has prompted a firestorm
of controversy, but the discussion thus far has been insular-one focused
on the efficacy of the WBP as a stand-alone program. Little attention has
been paid to the program's impact on the desirability of FOTM class
actions. But if it works as intended, the WBP promises to supplant the
deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions, while simultaneously increasing
their costs. Even if the SEC fails to effectively administer the WBP as
currently designed, the program has important implications for the FOTM
class action debate: coupling the elimination of FOTM class actions with
the addition of a qui tam provision to the WBP would be a significant
improvement over the status quo.
Understanding the relationship between the WBP and FOTM class
actions requires a sophisticated appreciation of the social welfare function
FOTM class actions actually play. Part I provides this needed background,
explaining why traditional rationales for corporate liability fail to justify
the large transfer payments FOTM suits effect between diversified
shareholders-the primary victims of fraud-on-the-market. It demonstrates
that if FOTM suits aid in deterrence, it is by virtue of the information they
On November 15, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. See Granted & Noted List Cases for Argument in October Term 2013, U.S. SUPREME COURT
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/13grantednotedlist.pdf. The first question
presented is "[w]hether this Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v.
Levinson ... to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-
on-the-market theory." See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. filed Sept. 9, 2013).
6 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 72 (2011) (asserting that the "consensus view among academics" is that
the FOTM class action "just doesn't work").
7 Pub. L.No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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produce about firm governance, not the circular remedies they impose. To
the extent they expose frauds, FOTM suits help to trigger severe market-
based punishment of not only the officers responsible for the fraud (who
will also face a heightened probability of government sanction as a result of
the suit), but their overseers as well. The specter of such punishment can
improve directors' and officers' ex ante incentives to invest firm resources
in fraud deterrence, as well as to avoid committing fraud themselves, thus
aligning their interests more closely with those of diversified shareholders.
Although FOTM class action settlement payments are not a significant
source of this punishment, they are important insofar as they create the pool
of funds from which shareholders compensate class action attorneys for
their fraud-detection efforts.
The WBP, which is described in detail in Part II, shares the same basic
purpose as FOTM class actions: fraud detection. It seeks to accomplish this
by increasing the benefits and decreasing the costs of blowing the whistle
for two groups of potential SEC tipsters: corporate "insiders" who have
independent knowledge of a securities law violation that is not derived
from publicly available sources (think Enron employee Sherron Watkins),
and corporate "outsiders" whose independent analysis of publicly available
data reveals information about a securities law violation that is not
generally known to the public (think Harry Markopolos). If such
individuals voluntarily present their information to the SEC before the
agency learns of it from independent sources, and it leads the SEC to
impose $1 million or more in monetary sanctions, the whistleblower is
entitled to between 10% and 30% of the sanctions collected. To further
incentivize whistleblowing, the WBP promises tipsters confidential
treatment and legal rights against retaliation.
Whether the WBP will succeed in increasing fraud detection, or do so
to such an extent as to justify the program's costs, has been the subject of a
rigorous debate. That debate is surveyed and evaluated in Part II. Missing
from the current conversation, however, is an appreciation of the
significant impact the program will have on the desirability of FOTM class
actions, should the WBP prove effective. As detailed in Part III, the fraud
detection capabilities of FOTM suits are naturally limited. FOTM class
action attorneys do not have privileged access to information about internal
corporate affairs, nor do they have the sort of legal investigative tools
available to the SEC. To the contrary, they are not even entitled to basic
discovery until after they file a complaint and survive a motion to dismiss
(a significant hurdle in light of heightened pleading standards imposed by
the PSLRA). If FOTM class action attorneys help to detect fraud then it is
because they are able to entice corporate insiders to reveal information to
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
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them, or because they have developed some expertise in analyzing publicly
available information to discern suspicious activity.
But now, insiders have much stronger incentives to participate in the WBP
than to serve as confidential informants in FOTM suits. And to the extent
FOTM attorneys have special fraud detection capabilities, they can
personally participate in the WBP (as can others with similar skills, which
the program can be expected to draw out). The upshot is that FOTM suits
are less likely to be responsible for exposing frauds in the wake of the
WBP, and more likely to merely parrot information that is already in the
public domain. FOTM suits that do not expose frauds produce no social
benefits while imposing significant costs on both investors and the
judiciary. The effect of the WBP (should it prove successful) will therefore
be to tip the cost-benefit scales against the social desirability of FOTM
suits, warranting their elimination.
This assumes, of course, that the SEC proves capable of acting on the
credible tips it receives. If it does not, the program may not replicate the
fraud detection benefits of FOTM suits. In this scenario, the WBP would
not justify the outright elimination of private enforcement of fraud-on-the-
market. The WBP would still, however, lay the groundwork for its
transformation. Part IV explains why adding a Rule lOb-5 qui tam
provision to a dysfunctional WBP would be a superior alternative to
retaining FOTM suits, and sketches what such a provision might look like.
Adding a qui tam provision to the WBP would ensure that tips not actively
being pursued by the SEC, or affirmatively judged thereby to be
insubstantial, could be pursued in private litigation. A qui tam provision
would thus help to sustain the WBP, even if the SEC proved incapable of
responding to the influx of whistleblower tips. As with FOTM suits, qui
tam litigation under the WBP would largely result in circular corporate
payments (shareholder-funded settlements or judgments, paid back to
shareholders through a Fair Funds distribution), with a cut going to the
private enforcers to reward them for their fraud detection efforts. But
unlike with FOTM suits, such rewards would be paid only in cases that
actually produced an informational benefit. And numerous inefficiencies
that result from the possibility of dual-track SEC and class action
enforcement would be eliminated. Qui tam litigation would also ensure that
any disciplining influence private Rule lOb-5 enforcement has exerted on
the SEC in the past is not lost. Finally, the proposal offers important
political advantages that make its adoption more feasible than prior reform
efforts.
9 Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes monetary penalties collected by the SEC to
be distributed to investors in a so-called "Fair Funds" distribution, along with disgorgement. See
15 U.S.C. § 7246; 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1100-.1106 (2013).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the
history of the controversial FOTM class action and explains its modem day
theoretical justifications. Part II provides a primer on the new WBP,
surveys its track record to date, and evaluates the debate that has raged over
its likely success. Part III broadens that debate to consider the impact of the
WBP on the case for FOTM class actions, explaining why the WBP's
success would justify the elimination of FOTM suits. Part IV presents the
idea of appending a Rule 1Ob-5 qui tam provision to the WBP, and
demonstrates why this would be a more attractive alternative to retaining
FOTM suits in the event the WBP proves unsuccessful in its current design.
The Article then briefly concludes.
I. FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET CLASS ACTIONS
A. What Are They and Where Do They Come from?
The Rule 1 Ob-5 "fraud on the market" class action has been described
as a "judicial oak" that grew "from little more than a legislative acorn."' 0
That legislative acorn was planted in 1942,11 when the SEC promulgated
Rule lOb-5 under authority conferred on it in Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 Rule 1Ob-5 makes it illegal to make any
false statement of material fact, or to omit to state facts necessary to make
statements not misleading, in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.' 3 At the time of its adoption, the rule was intended to close a
loophole in the SEC's enforcement authority and "had no relation in the
[SEC's] contemplation to private proceedings." 4 But only a few years
later, the federal courts found an implied private right to sue for damages
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. They did so by invoking the doctrine
that violating the command of a federal statute "is a wrongful act and a
tort" entitling the injured party to compensation. 5 Although the Supreme
Court has since held that no private cause of action shall be recognized
'o Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
" Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3230 (May
21, 1942) (available at http://3197d6dl4b5fl9f2f440-5el3d29c4c016cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.cfl.
rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1940/1942_0521_SECPR RuleX_10b5.pdf).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
" 17C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b).
14 Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).
"s Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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under federal law absent clear congressional intent,16 private enforcement
of Rule lOb-5 remains.17
In its early years, the Rule 1Ob-5 private right of action did in fact
operate much like a tort claim, with the federal courts requiring plaintiffs to
plead and prove essentially the elements of common law fraud.18 The main
advantage of suing under Rule 1Ob-5 as opposed to state law was the more
generous service of process provisions conferred on plaintiffs by the
federal securities laws.19 But over time, the Rule lOb-5 private right began
to lose its moorings in the common law. For example, the requirement that
a plaintiff stand in contractual privity with the defendant was abandoned,
exposing firms to suit by secondary market purchasers of their securities. 20
The most dramatic break with the common law tradition came in the
Supreme Court's seminal 1988 decision Basic Inc. v. Levinson.2 1 Relying
on finance theory, the Court observed that "the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations" about the value
of the shares.22 It therefore held that "where materially misleading
statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed
market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of
the market price may be presumed." 23 Basic thus allows plaintiffs who did
not actually read misleading corporate disclosures to sue under Rule lOb-5,
even though they would not be able to do so in a traditional common law
fraud case. It also eliminates individualized issues of proof regarding
reliance that tend to preclude class certification of common law fraud
claims.24 This is of critical importance, because the shareholders who rely
6 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001) (discussing the change in the Court's
approach to implied private rights of action in federal statutes).
"7 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 992-94 (1994) (describing implied private
right of action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as having been "grandfathered" by the Court).
8 Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) (observing that "many of the
principles applicable to common law suits apply by analogy to" Rule lOb-5 suits).
19 Indeed, this was the advantage sought in Kardon. See 69 F. Supp. at 513-14.
20 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir.
1974); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 639, 643 (1996) (noting "how controversial it was at common law to move beyond privity in
fraud cases").
2 485 U.S. 224 (1988). For a good discussion of the import of Basic, and the history leading up to
it, see Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
895 (2013).
22 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.
23 Id. at 247.
24 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013) ("Absent the fraud-
on-the-market theory [adopted in Basic], the requirement that Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs establish reliance
1241
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on the integrity of market prices rather than researching their stock picks
(and thus need Basic's presumption of reliance to state a claim) tend to be
diversified, owning only small stakes in specific companies; for them,
bringing suit individually under Rule 1Ob-5 would rarely be cost-justified.
The Basic decision, along with the Supreme Court's earlier
recognition of a presumption of reliance in omission cases,2S paved the way
for the modem Rule 1Ob-5 class action, which I refer to herein as a "fraud-
on-the-market" or "FOTM" suit. In a FOTM suit, an entrepreneurial lawyer
seeks redress on behalf of dispersed public shareholders who are alleged to
have purchased a firm's shares in the secondary market at a price
artificially inflated due to fraudulent misstatements or omissions, and to
have suffered a loss when the truth was revealed. The individuals
responsible for the alleged misrepresentations or omissions (usually the
firm's officers) are typically named in the suit, as is the firm itself.
Although the firm usually does not sell securities during the period of the
alleged fraud and, thus, does not directly benefit,2 6 it faces strict liability for
the frauds of its employees under common law principles of respondeat
superior liability.2 7 The plaintiff class typically consists of thousands of
shareholders, and the potential damage awards are therefore staggering.2 8
Perhaps as a result of this expansive liability exposure, and the expense and
distraction of prolonged litigation, FOTM suits almost always settle if they
survive a motion to dismiss. 29 And the settlements are almost always paid
would ordinarily preclude certification of a class action seeking money damages because individual
reliance issues would overwhelm questions common to the class.").
25 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
26 Sections II and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 contain express private causes of action
for fraud in connection with an issuer's primary offering of securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(a)(2)
(2012).
27 Strict corporate liability is imposed in Rule 10b-5 cases notwithstanding the fact that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains an express control person provision that allows for a good
faith defense. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-700.
28 Indeed, they can amount to a substantial percentage of a corporation's total capitalization. See
A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REv. 925, 928 (1999).
29 See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2006)
(finding "only thirty-seven securities law cases seeking damages that were tried to judgment against
public companies, their officers and directors, or both" in the period spanning 1980-2005, when
thousands of such cases were filed); Michael Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions
Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much? An Update, 26 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING
SOC'Y J., Apr. 2013, at 1, 2 (finding that "virtually all" securities class actions filed in the 2006-2010
timeframe that survived a motion to dismiss "were ultimately settled rather than tried"). The inability of
officers and directors to claim indemnification if they lose at trial is another commonly cited factor that
may push companies to settle. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An
Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1570 (2006). Plaintiffs'
1242
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for by the firm and (most typically) its insurer, without contribution from
the individual defendants. 3 0
The failure of firms to require individual defendants to contribute to
settlement payments in FOTM suits could be caused by several factors.
When, as is often the case, settlements are fully covered by insurance, there
is no need for contribution by either the firm or the individual defendants. 3 1
When the settlement exceeds policy limits, agency costs may explain a
board's decision to forego seeking contribution from the individual
defendants.32 Alternatively, boards may decide in good faith that imposing
liability on the defendant officers would do more harm to the firm than
good.33 Whatever the cause, the lack of individual monetary exposure
appears to be an intractable feature of FOTM suits. 34
B. What Purpose Do They Serve?
1. Compensation.-What justifies FOTM class actions? The
traditional response, consistent with the federal courts' original basis for
recognizing an implied private right to sue under Rule lOb-5, is victim
compensation. But few today defend FOTM suits on compensatory
grounds.3 5 This is due to a well-recognized "circularity problem." As
lawyers also have good reasons to favor settlement over trial. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note
6, at 102 (discussing plaintiff's-side litigation incentives).
30 A recent empirical study of securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010 found that the
insurer paid the full settlement in 58% of settled cases and partially funded the settlement in another
28%; outside directors contributed in none of the settled cases, and officers contributed in only 2%.
Michael Klausner et al., How Protective is D&O Insurance in Securities Class Actions? An Update,
26 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC'Y J., May 2013, at 1, 4. For an excellent introduction to the role
insurance plays in securities class actions, see TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT (2010).
3 See Klausner et al., supra note 30; see also Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class
Action Settlements: 2012 Review and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, http://www.cornerstone
.com/files/upload/ComerstoneResearch 2012_Settlements.pdf (last visited July 6, 2014) (reporting
that almost 80% of securities class action settlements were fully funded by insurance in 2011, whereas
approximately 65% were in 2012 (possibly due to higher settlement amounts in 2012)).
n See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 711 (advancing this hypothesis); Urska Velikonja,
Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1285-87
(2011) (same).
3 For example, if the fraud allegations are of dubious merit, the board may rightly worry that
requiring individual contributions would provoke undesirable disclosure practices by managers in the
future. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857, 864-66 (1984) (describing the efficiency gains that can flow from shifting legal risk
from managers to shareholders).
34 Reforms that would cause FOTM suits to result in greater managerial liability have been
proposed but have not gained momentum. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 29, at 1572-85.
3 See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 6 ("[A]n emerging consensus among most
corporate and securities law scholars rejects compensation as a justification for shareholder litigation.");
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explained above, corporations and the insurance policies they purchase
almost always fund the settlements in FOTM suits. As a result, the
shareholders ultimately pay for the compensation provided in this type of
litigation. FOTM suits therefore result in a transfer of funds from one group
of innocent shareholders to another. Over time well-diversified
shareholders will find themselves on both sides of the "v." in roughly equal
measure, meaning to them FOTM suits are an exercise in pocket shifting
or, worse, a negative proposition once attorneys' fees and other litigation
costs are taken into account.3 6
The argument that diversified shareholders are not compensated in any
meaningful sense by FOTM suits is often coupled with the argument that
these investors do not really need compensation anyway, because over time
they are likely to win as often as they lose from secondary market fraud-
sometimes winning when they sell at an artificially inflated price,
sometimes losing when they buy at an artificially inflated price. Thus, the
argument goes, the promise of out-of-pocket damages is not needed in
order to discourage diversified investors from undertaking inefficient self-
protection measures,38 and it does not serve a sensible insurance function.
Langevoort, supra note 20, at 651 ("[T]he compensatory system has relatively few informed, non-self-
serving defenders.").
36 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1503 (1996) ("[P]ayments by the corporation to settle a class action amount to transferring
money from one pocket to the other, with about half of it dropping on the floor for lawyers to pick
up."). Diversified shareholders make up an increasing percentage of the market. See INV. Co. INST.,
2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN THE U.S.
INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 37 (53d ed. 2013) (detailing the net inflow of capital into index
funds since 1998); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 884-86
(discussing the "[t]riumph of [p]ortfolio [tiheory").
37 This argument originated in Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel's seminal article
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985), and the "idea of compensation
for securities fraud losses has been under attack in the legal academy virtually ever since." Alicia Davis
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225-26 (2007) (challenging the idea that
diversified investors will not suffer net losses as a result of fraud-on-the-market, but acknowledging that
the FOTM class action is a poor vehicle for providing compensation).
3 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets,
78 VA. L. REv. 623, 635-41 (1992) (arguing that uninformed investors will not invest in precautions
regardless of the liability rule because they can cheaply diversify and thus avoid losses from secondary
market fraud). To be sure, informed traders are differently positioned, but the FOTM suit is a poor
vehicle for providing compensation to this subset of investors. See id. (demonstrating that the
presumption of reliance available in FOTM suits perversely incentivizes informed traders to invest
more in precautions than they would under an actual reliance rule); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 6, at 97-99 (advancing the argument that compensating underdiversified information traders makes
sense in theory but not in actuality); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private
Securities Litigation, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 333, 345-49 (arguing that informed traders warrant
compensation because they engage in reliance-based trading, but observing that because FOTM suits
compensate investors without regard to their reliance they dilute returns to informed investors).
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Finally, given that innocent shareholders indirectly fund the
settlements in FOTM suits, the compensation they provide cannot be
justified as serving corrective justice or retributive ends. 0
2. Deterrence.-In light of its perceived failings as a compensatory
tool, modem defenders of the FOTM suit herald it instead as an important
supplement to the securities fraud deterrence efforts of the federal
government and, in particular, the SEC.4 1 To understand this justification
requires an understanding of both the deterrence goal and the precise way
in which FOTM suits may assist in achieving it.
a. The goal.-An optimal securities fraud deterrence regime
would not deter all fraud at any cost; rather, it would minimize the sum of
the social costs of securities fraud (which I'll refer to as "underdeterrence
costs") and enforcement. As explained above, the distributional
consequences of secondary market fraud may be of little concern to the
extent public shareholders are diversified.4 2 But secondary market fraud
3 See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 718-19 (rejecting the loss spreading argument in the
FOTM context because diversified shareholders are risk-neutral and such suits do not effectively spread
losses to a larger group); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do
Not Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 297, 304-09 (explaining why risk-reallocation arguments for FOTM
suits are unpersuasive); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2067 (2010) (rejecting the insurance function of all small claims class actions
"because individuals are not risk averse with respect to small losses"); cf James J. Park, Shareholder
Compensation as Dividend, 108 MIcH. L. REV. 323, 340-344 (2009) (defending loss spreading as a
justification for investor compensation).
4 See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 719 (rejecting justice-based argument in favor of
FOTM suits because such suits "simply replace[] one group of innocent victims with another" and can
serve to "injure innocent people in addition to shareholders," such as employees). Further undermining
the compensatory rational is the fact that FOTM suits recover only a very small percentage of investor
losses. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1545-46 (surveying statistics on recovered losses in FOTM suits).
Indeed, an empirical study by Professors James Cox and Randall Thomas estimated that less than 30%
of institutional investors with provable losses bothered to file claims in settled FOTM cases. James D.
Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal
Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action
Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005).
41 See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 652 (describing the need for private enforcement to
supplement the SEC's deterrence efforts as "the conventional view"); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement
ofRule 1Ob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1314 (2008) ("As the original compensatory justification for
private Rule lOb-5 enforcement grew less persuasive, a deterrence-based justification took on increased
prominence."); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role ofAdministrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2005) ("Many scholars
have concluded that deterrence, rather than the need for private redress, has been the Court's primary
rationale for recognizing private causes of action under the securities and investor protection laws;
private plaintiffs in these cases are seen by courts not so much as 'victims' in need of compensation but
rather as private attorneys general.").
42 See INV. Co. INST., supra note 36 (detailing the net inflow of capital into index funds since
1998); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 36 (discussing the "triumph of portfolio theory").
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also imposes deadweight losses on society. For example, it impedes
shareholders' ability to monitor corporate managers, increasing agency
costs. It also causes bid-ask spreads to rise, reducing liquidity and making
portfolio adjustments more expensive.43
Enforcing a liability regime creates its own costs, of course. These
include not just the substantial funds required to investigate and prosecute
claims-funds which might be put to more productive use elsewhere-but
also so-called overdeterrence costs. Overdeterrence is a risk to the extent
that corporate agents fear inaccurate prosecution and legal error; such fear
may cause them to disclose less useful information to the marketplace, to
overinvest firm resources in the disclosure process, or even to avoid the
U.S. public capital markets altogether. Vicarious corporate liability can
have similar effects if firms fear wrongheaded prosecutions or if the
sanctions for failing to prevent a renegade agent from committing fraud are
too severe. To the extent that third parties like auditing firms and
investment banks face erroneous or outsized liability for aiding and
abetting securities fraud, they may increase the price they charge for their
services, or simply avoid servicing companies that pose too great a liability
risk.4
The deterrence argument in favor of FOTM suits is premised on the
idea that the SEC needs assistance in order to achieve the optimal level of
fraud deterrence, or stated slightly differently, that in the absence of FOTM
suits, underdeterrence costs would be too high. Why is the SEC presumed
to need help from the class action bar to deter fraud at optimal levels? Two
arguments are typically made. The first charges that the SEC has skewed
incentives that lead it to systematically underdeter-either because it is
captured by managerial interests that favor light enforcement, or because its
personnel are lazy, inept, or suffer from behavioral biases that lead them to
pull their punches (or to direct those punches at the wrong defendants).4 5
4 The ultimate effect is a higher cost of capital, which slows economic growth. For in-depth
discussions of the social costs of fraud-on-the-market and, conversely, the social benefits of accurate
disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
252-68 (2009); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005-42 (1992); Pritchard, supra note 28, at 937-45; and Urska Velikonja, The Cost
ofSecurities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1895 (2013).
4 For an in-depth discussion of how a liability regime can produce these costs, see Amanda M.
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2173, 2183-99 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation,
43 GA. L. REV. 63, 99 (2008) (observing that "securities class actions... guard against selective
enforcement and inaction by the SEC" and "overcome[] lackluster governmental incentives"); James J.
Park, Rules, Principles and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115,
121 (2012) (noting that advocates of decentralized enforcement argue "that competition among
enforcers can prevent a captured regulator from underenforcing the securities laws"); see also Stephen
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The second argument questions not the SEC's motives, but rather its
capacity to pursue investigations and enforcement actions at optimal levels
in light of resource constraints.46
Between the two, the resource-based argument likely has more
adherents, but it requires further discussion because it stands in apparent
tension with the theory of optimal sanctions. That theory posits that to
efficiently deter misconduct, a sanction should be set equal to the
externalized social costs of the misconduct multiplied by the inverse of the
probability the sanction will be imposed (assuming risk-neutrality). 47 Thus,
if misconduct causes $200 in harm and there is a 50% chance of being
sanctioned, the fine should be set at $400 (or its nonmonetary equivalent)
so that, on an expected value basis, a would-be violator fully internalizes
the costs of the contemplated misbehavior. If a government agency lacks
resources to pursue the misbehavior at levels that would lead to a 50%
enforcement rate, it could increase the fine and obtain the same level of
deterrence (for example, at a 10% enforcement rate the fine should be set at
$2000, or its nonmonetary equivalent).
This logic suggests that, if the SEC is underdeterring because it is
resource constrained, the solution is to increase the severity of the sanctions
it imposes for securities fraud, not to invite private enforcement, which, as
explained below, comes with significant costs. Indeed, expected utility
theory predicts that risk-averse persons will be more deterred by a
compensated increase in the severity of the sanction than an equivalent
compensated increase in the probability of detection.4 8 One compelling
answer to this objection to the resource-based argument in favor of private
enforcement is that people do not always behave as expected utility theory
would predict: in practice, "the probability of sanctions (or, as it is
frequently expressed, the certainty of sanctions) matters more than their
J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2003)
(cataloguing behavioral biases that may affect SEC personnel).
46 See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 126-27 (2005) ("Because the SEC lacks adequate resources to
effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an
appropriate level of deterrence."); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial
Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
323, 374-75 (2010) (detailing the resource constraints faced by the SEC and asserting that private
enforcement is needed to fill the gap); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 652 (accepting "the conventional
view that private litigation is a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement" because of federal resource
constraints, while suggesting that Rule lOb-5 class actions could be eliminated entirely "in a world with
an optimally staffed SEC").
4 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 483 (2004).
48 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment. An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178
(1968).
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magnitude."49 Increasing detection levels may be preferable to upping the
severity of sanctions for additional reasons as well. For example, increasing
monetary sanctions will increase the number of potential defendants who
are judgment proof, and increasing nonmonetary sanctions (e.g.,
lengthening prison terms) can be expensive and can raise marginal
deterrence and fairness concerns.so
The shift in rationale for FOTM suits from a private law/compensatory
justification to one grounded in public law notions of deterrence is
significant. As I have explained elsewhere, "There are few instances, at
least since our Republic developed a mature public law enforcement
capability, in which Congress has expressly granted private parties the right
to sue to enforce public law norms absent a traditional tort-like injury that
can be meaningfully redressed through litigation"; and those rare cases in
which it has done so, such as the qui tam action under the False Claims
Act, have proven highly controversial.5 There are good reasons for this.
One reason is that profit-driven private enforcement complicates the
task of setting optimal sanctions. When enforcers are profit-driven, the
magnitude of the sanction and the amount spent on enforcement cannot be
set independently. This is because "the level of the defendant's liability
determines the extent of enforcement (whether a suit will be brought and
how much will be spent by the parties on litigation)";5 2 thus, the higher the
sanction, "the higher the payoff from suit; the higher the payoff, the more
people will spend investigating and bringing suits." 53 This can drive
expected sanctions above their optimal level if actual sanctions are set
higher than social cost to account for a less than 100% probability of
enforcement.5 4 This, in turn, can lead to overdeterrence. Of course, some
misconduct (including securities fraud) has no social value, and society
would therefore wish to deter it unconditionally; with respect to such
49 SHAVELL, supra note 47, at 481. "In expected utility theory, the utilities of outcomes are
weighted by their probabilities. ... [But a series of choice problems demonstrates that] people
overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable-a
phenomenon [that has been labeled] the certainty effect." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265 (1979). This learning
"suggests that the probability of detection is far more likely to have an impact on agents than will
increasing the sanction when there is a very low probability of detection." James D. Cox, Private
Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (1997).
so See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 695 n.21 (1997).
5' Rose, supra note 41, at 1325-26.
52 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 146 (4th ed. 2011).
5 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 621.
' One solution to this problem is to decouple the bounty payment from the sanction, but this is
difficult to do effectively and can create opportunities for collusive settlements. See Rose, supra note
41, at 1327-28 (discussing the limits of decoupling).
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misconduct, the outsized sanctions private enforcement may produce would
not at first blush appear problematic. But outsized sanctions would remain
a concern if liability extended beyond the individual wrongdoers to their
employers (as it does in the case of securities fraud). This is because
vicarious liability is not designed to deter unconditionally but rather to
encourage firms to invest only socially optimal amounts in deterrence
efforts.
Even if sanctions could be perfectly calibrated, overdeterrence would
also remain a concern-with respect to both individuals and vicariously
liable firms-if inaccurate prosecution and legal error were feared, and this
is more likely to be the case in a regime of private as opposed to public
enforcement.ss The risk of inaccurate prosecution and legal error is greatest
when a law is overbroad or vague, or key issues of proof lend themselves to
subjective interpretation. This is the case with securities fraud. 6 In such
situations, a public enforcer can mitigate overdeterrence by engaging in
"discretionary nonenforcement"-declining to prosecute borderline cases
that could be won, but that risk producing undesirable behavior.57
"Discretionary nonenforcement allows society to avoid the costs of crafting
more precisely tailored rules, and the loopholes such rules inevitably
create. It also allows for ready adjustment by a public enforcer if beliefs
change as to the type of conduct that warrants sanction."58 But in a private
enforcement regime, "discretionary nonenforcement is a non sequitur"-if
bringing suit appears profitable, the suit will be brought.
Additional complications can arise from private enforcement if it
operates concurrently with public enforcement. For example, the specter of
private liability can frustrate efforts by public enforcers to reach
cooperative solutions with regulated parties.60
" Rose, supra note 44, at 2190.
56 See id. at 2185-86 (discussing how hindsight can bias judicial determinations relating to scienter,
particularly in cases involving forward-looking statements or omissions); see also infra note 66.
" William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement ofLaw, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
38 (1975).
18 Rose, supra note 41, at 1329.
'9 Id.; see also William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying
Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 766, 781 (2001) ("Robust private participation,
especially independent rights of action that eliminate a public prosecutorial monopoly, reduce or
eliminate the ability of government enforcement officials to use prosecutorial discretion as a
nonlegislative tool for altering the law."); Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 39 ("The existence of a
public monopoly of enforcement in a particular area of the law is a necessary . .. condition of
discretionary nonenforcement.").
6 See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 634
(2013) (noting the critique that "profit-motivated private enforcement will deprive regulatory regimes
of needed 'coherence' by, among other things, disrupting the subtle cooperative relationships that arise
between regulators and regulatory targets"); Stephenson, supra note 41, at 117-18 (discussing the ways
in which private enforcement can interfere with public enforcement efforts).
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That private Rule 1Ob-5 enforcement imposes these types of costs has
not gone unnoticed. To the contrary, concerns about frivolous FOTM suits,
and the overdeterrence they produce, have prompted a series of judicial and
congressional reforms. These include the adoption of stricter pleading
requirements in Rule 1Ob-5 class actions,61 a statutory safe harbor for
forward-looking statements,62  a discovery stay pending decision on a
motion to dismiss, 63 and the elimination of private aiding and abetting
liability.64
Although these reforms have gone a long way to discourage marginal
65litigation, concerns about the costs of FOTM suits remain. The scope of
the private right of action under Rule 1Ob-5 still has fuzzy borders. Strict
vicarious liability remains a feature of the regime, and it is frequently
observed that the out-of-pocket measure of damages used in FOTM suits
likely grossly exceeds the social harm actually caused by the fraud.
Another critique is that the specter of vicarious liability in FOTM suits may
dissuade companies from self-reporting fraud to, or otherwise cooperating
with, the SEC. 68 The widely condemned practice of SEC "no admission"
61 See generally Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the
Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537
(1998) (discussing the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements).
62 See generally Ann Morales Olazdbal, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What's Safe and What's Not?, 105 DICK. L. REv. 1
(2000) (discussing the PSLRA's safe harbor for forward-looking statements).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
6 See Rose, supra note 44, at 2198 n.62.
6' For empirical studies on the effectiveness of the PSLRA in weeding out frivolous claims, see
Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 598 (2006); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2006); and Michael A. Perino, Did
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913.
66 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 36, at 1494 ("It is not easy to state a clear standard [of
materiality] whose factual application can be readily understood, particularly when applied to
omissions."); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 644 (footnotes omitted) (observing that "scienter has a good
bit of indeterminacy to it, especially when we think of it in terms of awareness of the truth rather than
motive to deceive and even more when we consider its recklessness component," and that "[m]atters of
materiality and duty are often difficult to work through confidently").
67 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 36, at 1497 ("It seems likely that the true social costs of any
particular violation are significantly less than the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars represented by
potential class-based damages."); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 646 (arguing that "full out-of-pocket
compensation in open-market cases is systematically excessive and dysfunctional").
66 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 707 ("[T]raditional strict liability generates what we
term 'perverse effects': that is, strict liability only encourages policing measures insofar as they reduce
the incidence of misconduct, but it perversely discourages them insofar as they increase the firm's
expected liability for undeterred misconduct."). But see Cox, supra note 49, at 11-19 (challenging the
argument that strict corporate liability produces perverse effects). See generally Jennifer Arlen, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994)
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settlements, for example, is largely explained by firms' refusal to admit to
allegations that can be used against them in a follow-on FOTM suit.69
Finally, the burden FOTM suits impose on the .federal judiciary is
significant. 0
From an optimal deterrence perspective, the costs FOTM suits produce
are tolerable only if such suits produce an even greater savings in
underdeterrence costs. After all, if FOTM litigation increases enforcement
costs more than it decreases the social costs of securities fraud, it would
move the system farther from, rather than closer to, the ideal. At this point,
the debate tends to stall. Measuring under- and overdeterrence costs is
incredibly difficult, and significant empirical uncertainty therefore exists
regarding the relative costs and benefits of FOTM suits.71 A growing cohort
of scholars doubts that the deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions
exceed their costs. 72
But even the most vocal critics of FOTM class actions have remained
hesitant to recommend their abolition without compensating adjustments to
the U.S. securities fraud deterrence regime. Professors William Bratton
and Michael Wachter, for example, recently proposed a tradeoff: "[T]he
SEC should ask for more money and refocus its enforcement operation on
individual defendants and, in return, propose a rule that eliminates the
FOTM presumption [of reliance] in private litigation."74 Professor Merritt
Fox also recommends the elimination of FOTM suits, but as part of a
fundamental restructuring of the civil liability system governing mandatory
disclosure. 75 I have likewise argued for the elimination of FOTM class
actions, but only if simultaneous reforms are enacted to better align the
SEC's interest with the national interest in achieving optimal securities
(demonstrating how strict corporate liability can cause firms to spend less on efforts to detect employee
misconduct).
69 Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admission of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement ofLaw, 82 U.
CIN. L. REV. 505, 518 (2013) (explaining the SEC's belief that, were it to require admissions, "[flirms
would refuse to deal, primarily because the collateral consequences of factual admissions in public
enforcement actions can cripple firms, particularly in class action litigation").
70 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1539-42 (surveying statistics showing how securities class actions
tax the judiciary).
7' See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation
Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 183 (2009) (discussing these difficulties).
72 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 72 n.1 (discussing the growing academic consensus that
securities class actions are likely inefficient).
73 Some early critics of the FOTM class action were more resolute in their recommendations. See
Mahoney, supra note 38, at 626 (concluding that "FOTM should be rejected and that Rule lOb-5
plaintiffs should be required to prove reliance"); Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 734 (recommending
that respondeat superior liability be eliminated in FOTM suits).
74 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 82.
7 Fox, supra note 43.
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fraud deterrence.76 I have alternatively suggested that the SEC be given
authority to prescreen, and potentially veto or usurp, FOTM class actions.n
As far as politicians go, the empirical uncertainty over the desirability of
FOTM suits favors the status quo-especially in light of powerful vested
interests and the almost certain public backlash that would result should a
financial scandal emerge after Congress was perceived as cutting back on
fraud deterrence.
The thesis of this Article is that the SEC's new Whistleblower Bounty
Program (WBP) pushes the debate concerning FOTM suits forward in
important ways that are not currently being discussed. Specifically, the
WBP promises to greatly reduce the deterrence benefits that FOTM suits
may have produced in the past, while at the same time increasing their
costs. Thus, it should change minds regarding the desirability of FOTM
class actions. But before turning to the WBP and why it may have these
effects, it is important to understand precisely how FOTM class actions
may have assisted in fraud deterrence prior to the new program's
adoption-notwithstanding that the incidence of liability in such suits falls
not on the culpable officers, but on the corporation and ultimately its
innocent shareholders.
b. How fraud-on-the-market class actions may help.-It is often
asserted that FOTM suits aid in deterrence, without much elaboration. But
as explained below, the standard deterrence justification for civil litigation
against firms does not make sense in the FOTM context. This is not to say
that such suits lack all deterrence potential, but rather that the mechanism
through which they may promote deterrence is different than is commonly
understood. FOTM suits may aid in deterrence not by virtue of the
settlements they impose on firms, but rather by virtue of the information
they convey to the marketplace. They may also have the salutary effect of
causing the SEC to perform its deterrence job more effectively.
(1) Fraud detection.-The fact that corporations, and
ultimately their shareholders, foot the bill in FOTM suits does not
necessarily negate their deterrent value. Respondeat superior liability has
long been defended on deterrence grounds. The traditional argument is that
it forces a firm's owners to fully internalize the social costs of employee
76 Rose, supra note 44, at 2228-29.
n Rose, supra note 41, at 1354-58. A variety of other reform proposals directed at FOTM suits
have been advanced. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 36 (suggesting damages in FOTM suits be
replaced with civil penalties); Coffee, supra note 29 (suggesting ways to cause culpable insiders to
shoulder more of the liability in FOTM suits); Grundfest, supra note 17 (urging the SEC to consider
eliminating private Rule 1Ob-5 enforcement); Langevoort, supra note 20 (suggesting a cap on
compensatory damages in FOTM cases); Pritchard, supra note 28 (suggesting FOTM suits be replaced
with stock exchange enforcement).
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misconduct, thus providing them with an otherwise missing incentive to
invest firm resources in deterrence efforts. Firms have a variety of
deterrence tools at their disposal. For example, they can screen applicants
for their propensity to act lawfully, set up and maintain internal control
systems to monitor employees on the job, modify production processes to
reduce the likelihood of misconduct, use pay and promotions to reward
good behavior, and take steps internally to detect and punish misconduct.79
Without the threat of respondeat superior liability, the argument goes, a
firm's owners would lack incentives to invest in such socially desirable
deterrence efforts.o
Encouraging firms to invest in deterrence is thought important because
the threat of personal liability may fail to adequately deter. For example, if
sanctions are monetary, judgment-proof employees may ignore them.
Professors Jennifer Arlen and William Carney have argued that this is a
problem in the fraud-on-the-market context. Although the public company
CEOs and other high level officers who commit fraud-on-the-market tend
to be persons of means, Arlen and Carney hypothesize that most will find
fraud worthwhile only in "last period" situations when lying can buy them
time to turn around an ailing firm but being forthright will cost them their
jobs and much of their wealth; thus, they may expect to be judgment proof
in the event the fraud proves unsuccessful. 8' Employees might also
systematically underestimate the risk that their conduct may result in
certain harms (or in liability) due to behavioral biases, in which case
personal liability alone may lead to suboptimal deterrence. 8 2 Professor
Donald Langevoort has offered such a behavioral account for why officers
commit fraud-on-the-market. He posits that information-flow problems in
large organizations combine with "corporate cultural biases" (particularly
overoptimism and confirmation biases) to skew the information that
7 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1345, 1362-63 (1982).
7 For discussions of these methods, see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 702-03, 706; Alan
0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment
Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1988).
so Indeed, the employer might even promote the misconduct. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241-42 (1984).
8 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 702-03.
82 See Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705, 1733-37 (1996) (explaining how respondeat superior
liability can incentivize employers to "provide stimuli that promote reasonable behavior by complex
individuals who acting alone, undisciplined, would otherwise (even under the threat of tort liability) act
reasonably less often"); Komhauser, supra note 78, at 1373 (observing that "[o]nly enterprise liability
will lead to an appropriate level" of care "[i]f agents misperceive the costs of accidents and enterprises
do not," but noting that such misperceptions should dissipate over time as agents learn the costs of
accidents). This justification for respondeat superior liability assumes, of course, that employers would
be unable to fully and costlessly shift the expected liability back to employees.
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reaches officers; this in turn causes them to release false information to the
marketplace-first innocently and later intentionally-in what he describes
as an "optimism-commitment whipsaw effect."8  To be sure, nonmonetary
sanctions can fix the judgment-proof problem and, if salient enough,
perhaps the behavioral one, too. But respondeat superior liability may be a
less expensive deterrence fix. It might also be preferable if one does not
trust the government to impose nonmonetary sanctions at levels necessary
to produce optimal deterrence.
The traditional deterrence justification for respondeat superior liability
has its weaknesses, however-both in general and in the case of fraud-on-
the-market in particular. Professor Arlen, for example, has criticized the
fact that respondeat superior liability is strictly imposed. Forcing firms to
bear all the costs caused by their agents' employment-even those that
firms cannot prevent with due care-is often defended as a way to force
firms to take the full social costs of their operations into account when
setting activity levels.84 But Professor Arlen has observed that this can have
a perverse effect on a firm's incentive to engage in policing efforts because
those efforts may increase the likelihood that employee misconduct will
come to light and the firm, in turn, will be sanctioned. She thus favors a
vicarious liability regime that is either duty-based or that mitigates the
sanction imposed on firms if they can demonstrate reasonable policing
efforts as a way to encourage such behavior. Although government
enforcers often reward firms for their internal compliance efforts by
mitigating fines,87 the specter of crushing respondeat superior liability in
private litigation may stymie governmental efforts to influence firm
behavior.
When it comes to FOTM suits in particular, the traditional deterrence
argument in favor of respondeat superior liability loses force completely.
8 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 167 (1997).
84 See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 79, at 567 ("[When] the employer's business does not bear the full
cost of the compensable wrongs attendant upon its operation (either directly through liability payments
or indirectly through wages paid to employees who make liability payments), its profitability is inflated
relative to what it would be if the employee could pay judgments in full. In a competitive market, the
employer is then likely to expand production beyond the socially optimal level because his private
marginal costs of production are lower than the social marginal costs of production.").
85 See supra note 68.
86 See supra note 68.
87 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-4.htm) ("The [SEC's] decisions in particular cases are intended to encourage the
management of corporations accused of securities law violations to do everything within their power to
take remedial steps, from the first moment that the violation is brought to their attention. Exemplary
conduct by management in this respect weighs against the use of a corporate penalty; failure of
management to take remedial steps is a factor supporting the imposition of a corporate penalty.").
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This is because the social costs of fraud-on-the-market are borne most
directly by diversified shareholders. The threat of liability is therefore
unnecessary to encourage them to invest firm resources in fraud deterrence
efforts, or to adjust activity levels appropriately. As its primary victims,
diversified shareholders have natural incentives to take cost-justified steps
to prevent fraud-on-the-market-just as they have natural incentives to take
cost-justified steps to prevent other sorts of agency costs. 89 And because
these shareholders stand on both sides of the "v." in FOTM suits, the
possibility of settlement payments will not change their behavior in any
event. The "circularity problem" thus undermines not just the
compensatory rationale for FOTM suits, but also the deterrence rationale.90
The fact that the traditional justification for respondeat superior
liability is not persuasive in FOTM suits does not mean such suits lack any
deterrence potential, however. Even if FOTM suits are not necessary to
correct shareholder incentives regarding fraud deterrence, they could help
shareholders act on those incentives.91 To understand this argument
requires, first, an understanding of why boards' incentives to invest in fraud
deterrence may diverge from those of diversified shareholders, and, second,
how FOTM suits can help to align them.
Although diversified shareholders would naturally want the firms in
their portfolio to take reasonable steps to deter fraud-on-the-market, it is
the board of directors that actually controls a corporation's operations. And
directors may not share the natural incentives of diversified shareholders.
Whereas diversified shareholders are likely to lose as often as they win
from secondary market fraud, and thus do not stand to profit from its
distributional consequences, directors-and the officers to whom they may
feel beholden-are positioned differently. They have considerable wealth
tied up in the particular firms they serve, including stock, expected salary,
and reputational capital. If left unpunished, fraud-on-the-market could help
to enhance that wealth. In the absence of any threat of sanction, directors
might therefore invest fewer firm resources in fraud deterrence than
shareholders (and society) would prefer. A salient threat of sanction may
8 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
89 As Professor Velikonja has pointed out, others, such as employees, can suffer from securities
fraud as well; as a result, "no single ... class of private parties[] has optimal incentives" to prevent it.
Velikonja, supra note 43, at 1945. Still, most recognize that shareholders bear the brunt of the social
costs of fraud-on-the-market, meaning that their incentives, although not perfect from a social welfare
standpoint, come very close.
9o Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1679, 1688
(2011); see also Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 701 (describing FOTM as "an aspect of agency
costs"); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859 (2003) (recognizing that securities fraud class
actions relate to corporate governance failures).
91 Rose & Squire, supra note 90, at 1698.
1255
108: 1235 (2014)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
also be necessary to overcome behavioral biases that lead directors to
underestimate the likelihood that their CEO or other top officers would
engage in fraud. Shareholders have a variety of familiar weapons they can
use to sanction directors who fail to advance their interests: they can vote
them out of office, sue them for breach of fiduciary duty, or (most
promising) take the so-called Wall Street Walk. 92 But these threats are
credible only if shareholders are likely to learn of the managerial
malfeasance. And monitoring directors' efforts at fraud deterrence is very
difficult, and an anathema to the diversification strategy. 93
FOTM suits might be conceptualized as a way for shareholders to
outsource this monitoring function to the class action bar. When fraud is
exposed, it captures shareholders' limited attention, prompting them (and
the market more broadly) to impart whatever punishment is deemed
warranted on the board. This typically includes a share sell-off, leading to a
large drop in the firm's stock price, 94 which in turn hits management in the
pocketbook and increases the likelihood of a takeover. It also potentially
includes loss of position,9 5 as well as reputational damage. 9 6 The threat of
such punishment may, in turn, improve directors' ex ante incentives to
invest in fraud deterrence. Of course, FOTM suits can also produce large
settlement payments, and to the extent these are not covered by insurance,
92 The "Wall Street Walk" refers to the practice of "voting with [one's] feet"-that is, exiting the
investment by selling one's shares. Such action may, inter alia, depress the firm's share price and
expose management to the threat of a takeover. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The "Wall Street
Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009).
93 For a variety of reasons, the intermediary institutions that manage diversified investor funds
cannot be counted on to engage in active corporate monitoring on diversified shareholders' behalf. See
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 36, at 888-95.
94 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (finding in an empirical study that "[o]n average firms lose
38% of their market values when news of their misconduct is reported").
9s This is certainly the case for those implicated in the fraud. See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff et
al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (2008)
(finding in an empirical study that individual perpetrators of financial misconduct face significant
disciplinary action, with the vast majority getting fired).
96 See generally Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities
Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365 (2006) (empirical study finding that directors of companies sued in
securities class actions suffer a reputational penalty measured by a decrease in net board positions if
their case settles in the top quartile of settlement amounts or is accompanied by a parallel SEC
enforcement action).
97 Professor Urska Velikonja questions whether there is much that directors can do to guard against
fraud by top-level officers. See Velikonja, supra note 32, at 1304-05. Professors Arlen and Carney have
expressed similar doubts. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 27, at 715-16. If these scholars are correct,
the benefit side of the FOTM suit ledger was small to nonexistent even before the WBP. This is, indeed,
my own intuition. See Rose & Squire, supra note 90, at 1698-1703. But proving that empirical point is
not my objective in this Article; rather, my aim is to set forth the strongest theoretical case for FOTM
suits and to demonstrate how it is affected by the WBP.
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they, too, may impart punishment on the board through their impact on the
value of directors' shareholdings." But studies show that the bulk of the
decline in a firm's stock price upon the revelation of fraud is attributable to
reputational loss rather than anticipated legal penalties. 99 Thus, the
deterrence value of FOTM suits lies more in the information they produce
about the underlying fraud than in the legal remedies they impose.
The information FOTM suits produce could also help to deter would-
be fraudsters in a more direct fashion. Even though FOTM suits do not
result in the imposition of monetary sanctions on culpable officers, to the
extent they help detect frauds, they increase the likelihood that culpable
officers will be sanctioned by both the government (perhaps even
criminally) and by the firm itself.10
If FOTM suits help to reduce agency costs in the ways imagined
above, they may be worth the cost to shareholders notwithstanding their
apparent circularity.102 Their worth will turn, of course, on how much new
(and accurate) information they produce-that is, how much fraud they are
9 Professors Baker and Griffith have shown that insurers that issue Directors & Officers policies
attempt to price governance risk in setting premium amounts, but they conclude that the price
differentials are likely much too small to create incentives for worse-governed firms to improve. See
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 97-104. Their research also shows that insurance companies
themselves "neither monitor nor provide loss-prevention programs to the corporations they insure." Id.
at 105.
9 See Karpoff et al., supra note 94, at 582 (reporting that 24.5% of the decline in a firm's stock
price upon the revelation of financial misconduct reflects the market adjusting to the true value of the
firm if managers had not "cooked the firm's books," 8.8% reflects expected legal penalties, and 66.6%
reflects lost reputation; thus, reputation loss "exceeds the legal penalty by over 7.5 times, and it exceeds
the amount by which firm value was artificially inflated by more than 2.5 times").
10 The argument advanced here is in this way different from the one Professor Squire and I made in
Intraportfolio Litigation, supra note 90. Intraportfolio Litigation focused primarily on intercorporate
legal disputes between publicly held firms. It observed that those suits suffer from the same "circularity
problem" as FOTM class actions, undermining traditional compensatory and deterrence-based
rationales for corporate liability. But we argued that corporate liability might still serve a useful social
function in those suits, emphasizing that the damages imposed could assist diversified shareholders in
portfolio governance by causing "financial data about each portfolio firm to better reflect the
contribution of that firm's managers to overall portfolio wealth." Id. at 1697. Most intercorporate
disputes (for example, those involving contract breaches or patent violations) do not directly speak to
the quality of management in the way that securities fraud does, and thus, the impact of the damage
award or settlement payment on a company's stock price is likely to be a more significant informational
signal. Cf Bruce Haslem et al., How Much Do Corporate Defendants Really Lose? (May 21, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id=2290821) (empirical study
finding that firms involved in litigation other than securities litigation do not exhibit reliable signs of
reputational damage across various measures).
101 See supra note 95.
102 One way to gauge this would be to allow shareholders to opt their firms out of the FOTM class
action regime, as some scholars have advocated. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 128-32;
A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of
Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 217, 247-5 5.
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actually responsible for exposing. One should not overestimate their
contribution. 0 3 Many FOTM suits produce no new information because
they come after the fraud has been exposed by other sources and do not
otherwise enrich the public's understanding of what occurred. One study
concluded that private litigation uncovered only 3% of the incidents of
financial fraud exposed between 1996 and 2004 in companies with more
than $750 million in assets.104 The SEC fared better in that study, but only
slightly.105 Employees were responsible for exposing the largest percentage
of the frauds.10 6
These results are hardly surprising. Class action lawyers are corporate
outsiders and thus have no inherent advantage in detecting corporate
misconduct by virtue of their position. The SEC is also a corporate
outsider, of course, but it has powerful investigative tools. FOTM
plaintiffs, by contrast, must survive a motion to dismiss before being
entitled to even basic discovery. 0 7 What the class action bar brings to the
detection table, then, necessarily comes from its members' learned
expertise in analyzing publicly available information to identify suspicious
disclosure practices, as well as its skills in eliciting current or former
company insiders to divulge incriminating facts as confidential
informants. 0 8
(2) SEC performance.-In addition to any work they do
on the detection front, it has also been argued that FOTM suits may aid in
fraud deterrence by positively affecting the SEC's own efforts to detect and
punish securities fraud. 09 Without the FOTM class action bar looking over
its shoulder and threatening to pick up its slack, the SEC might be less
aggressive in its own enforcement activities."l0 This could be due to a fear
1o3 See Rose & Squire, supra note 90, at 1703 (opining that "the marginal amount of new
information generated by a private [FOTM] lawsuit against the corporation is likely to be extremely
small, especially as compared to the lawsuit's costs").
04 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2230
(2010).
Ios Id. at 2214 (reporting that the SEC was responsible for exposing 7%).
106 Id. at 2226 (reporting that employees were responsible for exposing 17%).
'0 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
1os The class action bar has been forced to hone the latter skill in the wake of the PSLRA because
confidential informants are often necessary in order to meet the statute's heightened pleading
requirements. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 637, 666-67 (2010).
'0 See supra note 45; see also Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A
Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REv. 1343, 1357 (2013)
(observing that "when multiple enforcers are tasked with regulating the same misconduct, competitive
instincts may kick in," thus "overcoming incentives to take the easier path").
"o For an examination of the forces that may lead government agencies to deviate from socially
optimal enforcement practices, see Rose, supra note 44, at 2210-19.
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of embarrassment or congressional reprimand should the class action bar
expose frauds the SEC failed to detect, or it could simply be a product of
the competitive spirit. Whatever the cause, the idea is that FOTM litigation
can improve the SEC's poor enforcement incentives, in addition to making
up for them through direct fraud detection.
One might imagine that the SEC also benefits from FOTM suits
because they allow the agency to outsource the litigation function, freeing
up SEC resources for other uses. But as explained above, the revelation of
fraud (and the market penalty it prompts) is far more important to
deterrence than are the corporate sanctions FOTM suits impose (which are
mostly covered by insurance"'). If fraud were exposed by other sources,
then there would be little reason for allowing a FOTM suit to proceed,
unless the pursuit of the case would likely result in revelation of details not
previously known to the public. But FOTM suits do not usually result in a
public airing of facts unearthed in discovery, if discovery takes place at
all.11 2 Nor does a judicial decision on a motion to dismiss appear to convey
important information to the market." 3 (To the extent FOTM suits are
themselves responsible for exposing frauds, they do relieve SEC budgetary
pressure, and allowing them to proceed to settlement is necessary in order
to produce a fund from which to compensate the lawyers for their efforts-
but this merely restates the justification for FOTM class actions discussed
in the previous Subsection.)
* * *
To summarize, if FOTM suits help to deter securities fraud, it is
because they assist in fraud detection, motivate the SEC to be more
aggressive in its enforcement efforts, or both. If FOTM suits are socially
" See supra note 98.
112 Such a public airing might occur in the briefing filed in connection with a motion for summary
judgment. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland, and Matthew Goforth conducted an empirical study of
533 securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010. See Klausner et al., supra note 29, at 1. In
response to my inquiry, Professor Klausner reported that a motion for summary judgment was filed in
only 5.4% of all resolved cases in their sample (29 out of 533). E-mail from Michael Klausner,
Professor, Stanford Law School, to author (May 30, 2013, 7:33 PM) (on file with author). Professor
Klausner and Jason Hegland conducted a similar study of securities class actions filed between 2000
and 2003. See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When
Do They Settle, and for How Much?-Part II, 23 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC'Y J., Mar. 2010, at
1. Professor Klausner informed me that a motion for summary judgment was filed in 10.6% of all
resolved cases in this sample (73 out of 692). E-mail from Michael Klausner, Professor, Stanford Law
School, to author (May 30, 2013, 7:33 PM) (on file with author).
'3 See Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class Actions
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-
009, 2001) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstracts=288216) (empirical study of securities fraud
class actions finding no statistically significant stock price reaction to decisions on motions to dismiss).
1259
108:1235 (2014)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
worthwhile, it is because the underdeterrence costs they thereby save
exceed the additional enforcement costs they produce. Prior to the creation
of the WBP, many doubted whether this was the case. As detailed in Part
III, the WBP now dramatically tips the scales against the desirability of
FOTM suits. But before exploring the program's impact on the FOTM
class action debate, it is necessary to understand how the WBP operates, as
well as the controversy that has surrounded its implementation. The next
Part provides this needed background.
II. THE SEC's NEW WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY PROGRAM
The Whistleblower Bounty Program (WBP) is a creation of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank).' 14 Section 922 of Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to create a new section 21F titled "Securities whistleblower
incentives and protection.""l5 While the basic contours of the WBP are laid
out in the statute, many details were left to the SEC to flesh out in
rulemaking.1 16 On August 12, 2011, final SEC rules regarding the WBP
became effective."' 7 Part II.A provides a basic overview of the WBP and
briefly discusses new protections it affords whistleblowers against
retaliation (those who are already familiar with the program's details may
wish to skip over this section). Part II.B reports on the WBP's track record
to date. Finally, Part II.C evaluates the debate that has raged over its design
and likely efficacy.
A. A Primer
The WBP entitles "whistleblowers"-defined as individuals (not
corporations or other entities) who provide the SEC with information about
possible securities law violations pursuant to specified procedures' '8-to a
bounty award if they meet several criteria. First, a whistleblower must have
provided information to the SEC "voluntarily."" 9 Second, that information
must have been "original." 20 Third, the information must have "led to" a
successful SEC enforcement action resulting in more than $1 million in
monetary sanctions (a so-called covered action).121 Finally, the
114 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
". 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
116 See id. §§ 78u-6(j), 78u-7(a).
"' See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300 (June 13,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter WBP Release].
"' 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2013).
"' See infra Part II.A.I.
120 See infra Part II.A.2.
121 See infra Part II.A.3.
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whistleblower must not otherwise be ineligible for an award.12 2 If these
criteria are met, the whistleblower is entitled to share in a bounty award of
between 10% and 30% of the sanctions collected in the covered action and
in certain "related actions," if procedural requirements for claiming an
award are followed.12 3
1. Voluntariness.-The voluntariness requirement encourages
whistleblowers to come forward with information early. To be considered
"voluntary," a whistleblower's submission must be made before the SEC
requests information related to the subject matter of the submission directly
from the whistleblower or the whistleblower's representative.124 It must
also be made before any similar request by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), any self-regulatory organization
(SRO), another authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney
General or securities regulator.'2 5 The mere fact that a whistleblower's
employer received a request from one of these authorities related to the
whistleblower's subsequent submission does not, however, render the
submission involuntary,' 26 nor does a whistleblower's receipt of a request
for information from his or her employer in connection with an internal
investigation.12 7 To be disqualifying, the request must come from one of
these authorities, and must be made to the whistleblower or his or her
representative (such as an attorney), directly.12 8
The voluntariness requirement also serves to direct whistleblower
awards to individuals who, in the absence of the WBP, might not come
forward at all. Under the rules, submissions are deemed involuntary if the
whistleblower was already required to report the information to the SEC as
a result of (1) a preexisting legal duty, (2) a duty arising out of a judicial or
administrative order, or (3) a contractual duty owed to the SEC, PCAOB,
any SRO, another authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney
122 See infra Part IL.A.4.
123 See infra Part II.A.5.
124 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(l)-(2) (2013).
125 id.
126 "For example, an examination request directed to a broker-dealer or an investment adviser
would not automatically foreclose whistleblower submissions related to the subject matter of the exam
from all employees of the entity." WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,307.
' Id. at 34,308.
128 In determining whether a whistleblower's submission "significantly contributed to" a covered
action, however, the SEC will "evaluate whether a previous request to the whistleblower's employer
obtained substantially the same information, or would have obtained the information but for any action
of the whistleblower in not providing the information to his or her employer. In such circumstances, [it]
ordinarily would not expect to treat the whistleblower's submission as having 'significantly
contributed' to [the covered action]." Id. at 34,309; see infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the "led to"
requirement).
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General or securities regulator. 12 9 If a contractual duty to report to the SEC
is merely owed to the whistleblower's employer, it will not render the
submission involuntary; the SEC is of the view that "employers should not
be able to preclude their employees from whistleblower eligibility by
generally requiring all employees to enter into agreements that they will
report evidence of securities violations" to the SEC. 130
2. Originality.-For whistleblowers to be entitled to a bounty, the
information they voluntarily provide must be "original."' 3 1 Section 21F
defines "original information" as information that is derived from a
whistleblower's "independent knowledge or analysis" and "is not known to
the [SEC] from any other source, unless the whistleblower is the original
source of the information."l 32 Further, the information cannot be
"exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative
hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, unless the whistleblower is a source of the information."1 3 3
"Independent knowledge" is defined by SEC rule as factual
information in a whistleblower's possession that is not derived from
"publicly available sources." 34 It is not limited to direct, first-hand
knowledge of law violations, but includes knowledge gained through a
whistleblower's "experiences, communications and observations in ...
business or social interactions."135 The term "independent analysis" is
defined to mean a whistleblower's "examination and evaluation of
information that may be publicly available, but which reveals information
that is not generally known or available to the public ... whether done
alone or in combination with others."' 36 "[T]here are circumstances," the
SEC has explained, in which "individuals can review publicly available
information, and, through their additional evaluation and analysis, provide
vital assistance to the [SEC] staff in understanding complex schemes and
identifying securities violations."
In addition to being derived from independent knowledge or analysis,
to be "original" the information must not already be known to the SEC
from any other source, "unless the whistleblower is the original source of
129 17 C.F.R. § 240.21 F-4(a)(3).
13o WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,309.
"' 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a).
132 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3) (2012).
134 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-4(b)(2).
13 Id.
'6 Id. § 240.2 1F-4(b)(3).
137 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,312.
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the information."1 3 8 A whistleblower will be deemed the "original source"
of information the SEC first obtained from another source if the other
source obtained the information from the whistleblower or the
whistleblower's representative.13 9 To be considered the original source of
information the SEC first obtains from another governmental authority or
SRO, the whistleblower must have "voluntarily" provided the information
to such authorities as that term is defined above.140
The following hypothetical may help to illustrate how the originality
requirement operates. Assume that Sally tells her coworker Frank about
possible securities law violations she discovered taking place at their
employer, Alpha Corporation. The suspected violations are not publicly
known, and the SEC is unaware of them. Frank in turn reports the
information he learned from Sally to the SEC. After receiving Frank's tip,
the SEC commences an investigation. On these facts, Frank's submission
counts as "original information" because it is based on his "independent
knowledge" (a concept that, as noted above, includes second-hand
information received from non-public sources) and was not previously
known by the SEC. If Sally reports the same information to the SEC after
Frank, her submission will also count as "original information" because it
is likewise based on "independent knowledge" and, although Frank already
made the SEC aware of the information, Sally is the "original source" of
Frank's submission. Thus, both Frank and Sally will potentially be entitled
to share in a bounty award if an enforcement action is brought against
Alpha Corporation resulting in more than $1 million in monetary sanctions.
This is not to say, however, that Frank and Sally will be treated
identically. Frank and Sally will be treated differently by virtue of the
timing of their respective submissions. By reporting first, Frank will have
an easier time than Sally in establishing that his tip "led to" a covered
action, a concept discussed below. And if Frank's tip prompted the SEC to
question Sally before she made her submission, Sally will be unable to
meet the voluntariness requirement discussed above. Assuming both Frank
and Sally succeed in establishing their eligibility, the timing of their
submissions may also impact the size of their respective awards.14 1
3. Leading to Success.-A whistleblower's submission must "lead[]
to" a successful SEC judicial or administrative action that results in
monetary sanctions (including penalties, disgorgement, and interest 42) of
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3).
"9 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5).
140 id.
141 See infra Part II.A.5.
142 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(4).
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more than $1 million-a so-called covered action. 14 3 In determining
whether a covered action exists, the SEC may aggregate the monetary
sanctions in two or more separately captioned SEC actions, if the
proceedings arise from the "same nucleus of operative facts.' "
Whether a whistleblower's submission of original information "led to"
a successful covered action depends on if the original information
submitted concerned conduct already actively under investigation, by either
the SEC or certain other authorities. If an investigation was already
underway, the whistleblower's submission must have "significantly
contributed to the success" of the covered action.14 5 If no investigation had
begun, the original information submitted need only have been
"sufficiently specific, credible, and timely" to cause the SEC to commence
an examination, open (or reopen) an investigation, or "to inquire
concerning different conduct as part of a current examination or
investigation," and the SEC must have brought a covered action "based in
whole or in part on conduct that was the subject of [the] original
information."l 4 6 Thus, in the hypothetical posed above, the SEC would
judge Frank's submission under the easier "sufficiently specific, credible,
and timely" test because it was received before an investigation concerning
the alleged misconduct was underway. Sally's tip, by contrast, would have
to meet the tougher "significant contribution" test.
This would not be the case, however, if Frank were part of Alpha
Corporation's internal compliance department, and Sally reported the same
information to the SEC within 120 days of reporting it to Frank. SEC rules
provide that if a whistleblower provides information through "an entity's
143 Id § 78u-6(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a)(3)-(4).
'44 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d)(1).
145 Id § 240.21F-4(c)(2). The SEC has indicated that in applying this standard, it will look at
factors "such as whether the information allowed [it] to bring: (1) [a] successful action in significantly
less time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional successful claims; or (3) successful claims
against additional individuals or entities." WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,325. The SEC has also
noted that, absent extraordinary circumstances, it will not consider information to have "significantly
contributed" to the success of a covered action if "(i) [the SEC] or some other law enforcement agency
has issued a subpoena or other document request, inquiry or demand to an entity or an individual other
than the whistleblower; (ii) there is evidence that the whistleblower was aware of the investigative
request, inquiry or demand; and (iii) the whistleblower withheld or delayed providing responsive
documents prior to making the related submission to the Commission." Id
146 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(1). The SEC has indicated that its inquiry will "focus on whether the
submission identifies persons, entities, places, times and/or conduct that correspond to those alleged" by
the SEC in the covered action, and that it may consider "whether, and the extent to which, the
information included: (1) Allegations that formed the basis for any of the [SEC's claims in the covered
action]; (2) provisions of the securities laws that the [SEC] alleged as having been violated in the
[covered] action; (3) culpable persons or entities (as well as offices, divisions, subsidiaries or other
subparts of entities) that the [SEC] named as defendants, respondents or uncharged wrongdoers in the
[covered] action; or (4) investors or a defined group of investors that the [SEC] named as victims or
injured parties in the [covered] action." WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,324.
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internal whistleblower, legal, or compliance procedures," or to PCAOB,
any SRO, another authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney
General or securities regulator, and within 120 days the whistleblower
submits the same information to the SEC, the SEC will treat the
whistleblower as having submitted the information to the SEC "as of the
date of [the] original disclosure, report or submission to one of these other
authorities or persons."l47 In this revised hypothetical, Sally would
therefore have an easier time establishing that her tip "led to" a covered
action because it would be treated as having been made prior to the
commencement of the SEC's investigation, thus subject to evaluation under
the easier "sufficiently specific, credible, and timely" test. Frank, as a
compliance officer, would likely be rendered ineligible for an award, as
discussed infra in Part II.A.4.
This special rule is meant to mitigate the possibility that the WBP will
discourage employees from reporting internally before going to the SEC
for fear of losing their entitlement to a bounty and thus undermine the
effectiveness of internal compliance programs.148 The SEC also sought to
encourage internal reporting by adopting a rule that, in certain situations,
credits a whistleblower with information uncovered by an internal probe.
Specifically, a whistleblower who reports information internally at the
same time or up to 120 days before the whistleblower reports the same
information to the SEC will be credited with any information the entity
later submits to the SEC that was discovered in the course of an internal
audit or investigation initiated as a result of the whistleblower's report.149
In the revised hypothetical, for example, it could be that the information
that Sally provided to Frank, and later to the SEC, was not itself
sufficiently "specific" and "credible" to cause the SEC to open an
investigation. But if her disclosure to Frank prompted an internal
investigation that uncovered additional information about securities law
violations, and Alpha Corporation reported that information to the SEC,
Sally might nevertheless be able to claim a bounty. She would be given
credit by the SEC for all of the information submitted by Alpha
Corporation and in this way potentially satisfy the "leading to success"
requirement.
4. Ineligible Whistleblowers.-A variety of whistleblowers are
ineligible for a bounty award even if they satisfy these criteria. Ineligible
whistleblowers include employees of certain governmental agencies and
147 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-4(b)(7).
148 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,322-23.
149 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-4(c)(3).
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self-regulatory organizations,1o persons who fail to submit their
information in the form and manner specified by the SEC, and those who
fail to comply with SEC requests related to their submission.'5 '
Whistleblowers are also ineligible if they knowingly provide false or
misleading information to the SEC with intent to hinder or mislead,' 52 or
obtain their information "by a means or in a manner that is determined by a
United States court to violate applicable Federal or state criminal law."' A
whistleblower's culpability for the misconduct at issue in the SEC action or
related action for which an award is sought does not result in ineligibility
unless the whistleblower is convicted of a related criminal violation.154 But
when considering a culpable whistleblower's application for a bounty, any
monetary sanctions he or she has been ordered to pay, or which an entity
whose liability is based substantially on his or her conduct is ordered to
pay, will be excluded in the SEC's determination of whether the $1 million
threshold for a "covered action" has been met, and such sums "will not be
included within the calculation of the amounts collected for purposes of
making [bounty] payments."'ss Further, as discussed in Part II.A.5,
culpability is a factor that may cause the SEC to decrease the percentage of
collected sanctions awarded to a whistleblower.
Whistleblowers are also excluded from eligibility if they obtained their
information "through a communication that was subject to the attorney-
client privilege" or "in connection with the legal representation of a client
on whose behalf [the whistleblower or his or her] employer or firm are
providing services." 56 There is an exception, however, if disclosure of the
information would otherwise be permitted by 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) or
the applicable state attorney conduct rules. 57 This exclusion is designed to
iso Id. § 240.21F-8(c)(1)-(2). Spouses, parents, children, siblings, and household members of SEC
employees are also excluded from eligibility. Id. § 240.21 F-8(c)(5).
"' Id § 240.2 1F-8(a)-(c).
152 Id. § 240.2 1F-8(c)(7).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iv). Technically, information obtained in this manner is excluded from the
definition of "original information."
154 Id. § 240.21F-8(c)(3).
ss Id. § 240.2 1F-16.
6 Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)-(ii). Technically, information obtained in this manner is excluded from
the definition of "original information." See also WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,314-15.
'5 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,314. Section 205.3(d)(2) allows an attorney appearing and
practicing before the SEC in the representation of an issuer to reveal client confidences without the
issuer's consent if necessary "[t]o prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely
to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors," to prevent the
issuer from committing perjury in an SEC investigation or otherwise perpetrating a fraud on the SEC,
and to "rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may cause,
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of
which the attorney's services were used." 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2). See generally Barry R. Temkin &
Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical
1266
Better Bounty Hunting
prevent the WBP from interfering with the attorney-client relationship by
encouraging attorneys to breach confidences for personal financial reward,
except in those situations where the law already countenances disclosure.
The WBP also seeks to avoid "creating incentives for independent
public accountants to [personally] benefit by 'front running' the firm's
proper handling of information obtained through engagements required
under the Federal securities laws." 58 Thus, whistleblowers who obtained
their information in connection with an audit of a company's financial
statements are ineligible if disclosing the information to the SEC was
contrary to requirements of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.' Whistleblowers are also ineligible if they are associated with a
public accounting firm and obtained their information through the
performance of an engagement (other than an audit) required of an
independent public accountant under the federal securities laws, and the
information relates to a violation by the engagement client or the client's
directors, officers, or other employees.' 6 0
The exclusion for whistleblowers who obtained their information in
the course of an accounting engagement required under the federal
securities laws is subject to an important exception. Such a whistleblower
may claim a bounty if he or she has "a reasonable basis to believe that
disclosure of the information to the [SEC] is necessary to prevent the
relevant entity from engaging in conduct that is likely to cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the entity or investors," has "a
reasonable basis to believe that the relevant entity is engaging in conduct
that will impede an investigation of the misconduct," or "[a]t least 120 days
have elapsed since [the whistleblower] provided the information to the
Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 N.Y. ST. B.A. J., July-Aug.
2012, at 10.
158 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,318.
159 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(4). Section 10A details the steps
that a registered public accounting firm must take if, in the course of an audit of an issuer, it becomes
aware of information indicating that an illegal act may have occurred at the issuer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(b). These steps begin with internal reporting through the client's corporate hierarchy, and end with
disclosure to the SEC only if the issuer has not responded appropriately. See id. Whistleblowers who
acquire information from a person who would be ineligible for this reason are likewise ineligible unless
they are providing the SEC "with information about possible violations involving that person." 17
C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-8(c)(6)(i).
160 Technically, information obtained in this manner is excluded from the definition of "original
information." 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(D). The SEC has made clear that "[p]ersons working on
other engagements, to the extent that they are not covered by Section I 0A or are not required under the
Federal securities laws, will not be deemed ineligible simply because the engagement is with an audit
client of the firm." WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,336. Moreover, tips about violations of Section
1OA are not contrary to the requirements of Section I0A; thus, an employee of a public accountancy
firm who reports on his or her employer's failure to comply with Section IOA would be "eligible for an
award based on a covered action against the public accountant or the issuer." Id. at 34,336 n.315.
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relevant entity's audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance
officer (or their equivalents), or [the whistleblower's] supervisor."16 1
Subject to the same important exception, whistleblowers are ineligible
if they obtain their information because: (1) they serve as an "officer,
director, trustee, or partner of an entity and another person informed [them]
of allegations of misconduct, or [they] learned the information in
connection with the entity's processes for identifying, reporting, and
addressing possible violations of law";162 (2) they are an "employee whose
principal duties involve compliance or internal audit responsibilities, or
[they] were employed by or otherwise associated with a firm retained to
perform compliance or internal audit functions for an entity";163 or (3) they
are employed "by or otherwise associated with a firm retained to conduct
an inquiry or investigation into possible violations of law."' 64 These
exclusions are designed to ensure "that the persons most responsible for an
entity's conduct and compliance with law are not incentivized to promote
their own self-interest at the possible expense of the entity's ability to
detect, address, and self-report violations." 65
5. Criteria for Determining the Bounty Award.-If one or more
whistleblowers meet the above criteria and follow the required procedures
for making a claim (discussed below), the SEC must award them, in the
aggregate, at least 10% but not more than 30% of the monetary sanctions
collected in the covered action.166 Within this range, the amount awarded is
in the sole discretion of the SEC. 67 The SEC must also pay eligible
whistleblowers amounts equal to 10%-30% of the monetary sanctions
collected in certain "related actions"'68 if specified claims procedures are
followed.'69 An action is "related" if it is based upon the same original
information that led to the covered action, and is brought by the Attorney
General of the United States, an "appropriate regulatory agency," 70 an
161 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v). If the whistleblower received the information under
circumstances indicating that the entity's audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance officer
(or their equivalents), or the whistleblower's supervisor was already aware of the information, 120 days
must have elapsed from the date the whistleblower received the information. Id.
162 Id. § 240.2 1F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A).
6' Id. § 240.21 F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B).
'6 Id. § 240.2 1F-4(b)(4)(iii)(C). Technically, information obtained in any of these three manners is
excluded from the definition of "original information."
61 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,314.
166 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012).
161 Id § 78u-6(c)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(a).
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(b).
169 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F- Il (detailing these procedures).
17o "Appropriate regulatory agency means the [SEC], the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of
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SRO, or a state Attorney General in a criminal case.' 7 ' To give an award
based on a related action, the SEC must determine that the original
information the whistleblower gave to the SEC "also led to the successful
enforcement of the related action under the same criteria" used to evaluate
awards for covered actions.17 2
In exercising its discretion to determine the appropriate award, and, if
there are multiple eligible claimants, their respective portions, the SEC will
consider several factors.'7 3 In deciding whether to increase the amount of a
whistleblower's award, the SEC will consider (1) the significance of the
information provided to the success of the covered action or related
action,174 (2) "the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower,"17 5
(3) the SEC's "programmatic interest. . . in deterring violations of the
securities laws,"' 76  and (4) the extent to which the whistleblower
participated in internal compliance systems.'" In deciding whether to
decrease the amount of a whistleblower's award, the SEC will consider
(1) the "culpability or involvement of the whistleblower in matters
associated" with the covered action or related action;'78 (2) whether the
whistleblower unreasonably delayed in reporting the suspected securities
violations;179 and (3) "in cases where the whistleblower interacted with his
or her entity's internal compliance or reporting system, whether the
whistleblower undermined the integrity of such system." 80 These factors
are merely guidelines, not a rigid formula-"the determination of the
appropriate percentage of a whistleblower award will involve a highly
individualized review of the facts and circumstances surrounding each
award."' 8'
6. Claims Process.-Dodd-Frank mandated the creation of a new
"Office of the Whistleblower" (OWB) within the SEC's Division of
Thrift Supervision, and any other agencies that may be defined as appropriate regulatory agencies under
Section 3(a)(34) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34))." 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(f).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-3(b)(1).
1" 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(b)(2).
17 If the SEC makes awards to multiple claimants, it "will determine an individual percentage
award for each whistleblower, but in no event will the total amount awarded to all whistleblowers in the
aggregate be less than 10 percent or greater than 30 percent of the amount" collected. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.2 1F-5(c).
'74 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(I); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(1).
7s 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(II); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(2).
176 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(Ill); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3).
1' 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
"' Id § 240.21F-6(b)(1).
1' Id § 240.2 1F-6(b)(2).
"s Id § 240.21 F-6(b)(3).
1 WBP Release, supra note 117, at 34,331.
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Enforcement, and charged it with administering the WBP.18 2 According to
the SEC's fiscal year 2013 annual report on the WBP program, OWB is
currently staffed by a chief, deputy chief, nine attorneys, and three
paralegals.' 83 Among other things, the OWB maintains a website that
provides information about the WBP as well as links to the forms required
to submit a tip (Form TCR) and apply for a bounty payment (Form WB-
APP). The OWB ensures that any Form TCR it receives by mail or fax is
inputted into the SEC's "Tips, Complaints, and Referrals System" (the
TCR System), a new centralized database for the "prioritization,
assignment, and tracking of TCRs received from the public."' 84
Whistleblowers also have the option to input their tip directly into the TCR
System via an online version of Form TCR.
Once in the TCR system, a whistleblower's tip is "triaged" by the
Enforcement Division's Office of Market Intelligence (OMI), a newly
created office staffed with "a team of more than [forty] former traders,
exchange experts, accountants and securities lawyers," as well as an agent
on loan from the FBI.' 8 OMI evaluates each tip and assigns those
identified as "sufficiently specific, timely, and credible to warrant the
further allocation of [SEC] resources" to appropriate enforcement staff.186
As the SEC's investigation proceeds, the OWB serves as a liaison between
the whistleblower (or his or her lawyer) and enforcement staff; it also
works with enforcement staff to track enforcement cases involving
whistleblowers "to assist in the documentation of the whistleblower's
information and cooperation in anticipation of an eventual claim for
award." 87
After a final judgment is entered in a covered action, the OWB posts
on its website a "Notice of Covered Action."' 88 Whistleblowers then have
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(d) (2012).
183 SEC 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 5
[hereinafter WBP 2013 Report].
184 SEC ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2012,
at 4 [hereinafter WBP 2012 Report]. For more information on the TCR System and OMI, see Bruce
Carton, Details Emerge on SEC Office of Market Intelligence, SECURITIES DOCKET (Feb. 9, 2010, 7:24
PM) http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/02/09/details-emerge-on-sec-office-of-market-intelligence/;
Sarah N. Lynch & Matthew Goldstein, Exclusive: SEC Builds New Tips Machine to Catch the Next
Madoff REUTERS, July 27, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-sec-investigations-
idUSTRE76Q2NY20110727; and Ben Protess & Azem Ahmed, With New Firepower, SEC Tracks
Bigger Game, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 21, 2012, 9:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/05/21/with-new-firepower-s-e-c-tracks-bigger-game.
'5 Protess & Ahmed, supra note 184.
16 WBP 2012 Report, supra note 184, at 5. "When appropriate, tips that fall within the jurisdiction
of another federal or state agency are forwarded to the [SEC] contact at that agency." Id.
' Id. at 3.
. 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-10(a) (2013).
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ninety days to file a claim for an award based on that covered action. 18 9
After the time for filing an appeal of the covered action has expired, or, if
an appeal has been filed, after the appeal has been concluded, the SEC will
evaluate any whistleblower claims that have been timely filed in
connection with the action. 190 It will determine whether any of the
claimants meet the criteria for a bounty and, if so, the appropriate
percentage of collected sanctions to award them as a bounty. 191 A
whistleblower can appeal the SEC's final decision denying his or her
entitlement to an award, but an SEC decision regarding the amount of an
award (including the allocation of an award between multiple
whistleblowers) is not appealable as long as the award falls within the
required 10%-30% range. 19 2
7. Protection Against Retaliation.-Even the lure of a substantial
bounty payment may not be enough to compel individuals to become
whistleblowers if they fear retaliation at work. Congress thus sought to
encourage participation in the WBP by prohibiting employers from
discriminating against whistleblowers in the terms and conditions of
employment because they have provided information to the SEC or have
assisted the SEC in an investigation or prosecution related to that
information.193 This provision is enforceable in an action or proceeding
brought by the SEC.1 4 Moreover, a whistleblower who believes his or her
employer has violated this provision may sue for reinstatement, double
back pay owed, and fees and costs. 19 5 Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley's
antiretaliation provision, which requires claims be brought through the
Department of Labor,19 6 the WBP's antiretaliation provision allows
whistleblowers to sue directly in federal court.197 It also affords plaintiffs a
more generous statute of limitations. 9 8 To be entitled to this protection,
190 Id § 240.21F-10(d).
' This involves multiple layers of review. See WBP 2012 Report, supra note 184, at 7; SEC
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF THE SEC's WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, REP. No.
511, at 5 (2013) [hereinafter OIG Report].
192 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a).
19 The retaliation provision also protects individuals who have made disclosures that are required
or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley or a variety of other laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
194 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2).
19 15 u.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
196 See OSHA Fact Sheet: Filing Whistleblower Complaints Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2011),
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha-factsheet-sox-act.pdf.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
' Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). For a discussion of the problems with Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation
provision, see Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1764-67
(2007). For a discussion of how the WBP's antiretaliation provision seeks to avoid these problems, see
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whistleblowers need not qualify for a bounty award; it is sufficient that
they possessed a "reasonable belief' that the information they provided to
the SEC related to a "possible" securities law violation.' 99
The WBP also seeks to protect whistleblowers by requiring the SEC to
keep a whistleblower's identity confidential until it must be disclosed to a
defendant in a public proceeding, or until the SEC deems it necessary to
share it with certain other authorities (in which case those authorities must
keep it confidential). 200 A whistleblower also has the option of remaining
anonymous up to the point of receiving a bounty, at which time the
whistleblower's identity must be disclosed to the SEC.2 0 1 Anonymous
Form TCRs must be submitted through an attorney, however, and the
whistleblower must provide that attorney with a declaration under penalty
of perjury that the information on the form is true and correct.2 02
(Nonanonymous whistleblowers must make such a declaration directly on
their Form TCRs.20 3) Finally, the WBP makes it unlawful to take actions to
impede an individual from becoming a whistleblower, including by
threatening to enforce a confidentiality agreement (except agreements
related to legal representation).204
B. Track Record to Date
While the WBP remains in its infancy, some preliminary data shed
light on its operations thus far. The SEC is required to file an annual report
with Congress reporting on the WBP and the current state of the Investor
Protection Fund (IPF), the account from which bounties are paid.2 05 In
Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud
and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of the Whistleblower
Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 873, 914-15 (2011).
"9 17 C.F.R. § 240.21 F-2(b).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7.
201 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7(b), .21F-9(c), .21F-10(c).
202 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-7(b)(1), .21F-9(c).
203 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 1F-9(b).
204 Id. § 240.2 1F-17(a).
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(5). Dodd-Frank mandates that bounty payments be made out of the
newly created IPF, which is also to be used for funding the SEC Inspector General's suggestion
program. Id. § 78u-6(g)(2); WBP 2012 Report, supra note 184, at 9 n.17. The IPF has three funding
sources. First, any monetary sanctions collected by the SEC that are not paid into a fund for victims
under section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or otherwise distributed to victims must be deposited into
the IPF, unless the IPF's balance exceeds $300 million at the time the sanction is collected. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(i). Second, any money in a section 308 fund that is not distributed to victims must be
transferred to the IPF unless the IPF's balance exceeds $200 million. Id. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(ii). Third, if
there is not enough money in the IPF to pay a bounty award, the monetary sanction collected in the
covered action on which the award is based shall be deposited into the IPF to cover the shortfall. Id.
§ 78u-6(g)(3)(B). The IPF may also keep any income from investments made with its funds. Id. § 78u-
6(g)(3)(A)(iii); see also id. § 78u-6(g)(4) (detailing the investments that may be made with IPF funds).
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addition, the OWB must report annually to Congress "on its activities,
whistleblower complaints, and the response of the [SEC] to such
complaints."20 6 In November 2013, the SEC filed a consolidated report
covering the second full fiscal year of the WBP and OWB's operations.
According to that report, the IPF is fully funded, with a balance of
over $439 million as of the close of the 2013 fiscal year.2 0 8 The report also
indicates that over the course of the 2013 fiscal year, the OWB returned
over 2810 phone calls to its whistleblower hotline 2 09 received 3238
whistleblower tips (as compared to 3001 in fiscal year 2012),210 posted 118
Notices of Covered Action, 211 and oversaw the award of four whistleblower
bounties-including one for over $14 million.212 The number of bounties
awarded in fiscal year 2013 is double the number awarded in fiscal year
2012213 and is likely to grow further in fiscal year 2014, as more cases
complete what can be a long progression from initial receipt of a TCR to an
actual award determination. "The most common complaint categories
reported by whistleblowers . . . were Corporate Disclosures and Financials
(17[.]2%), Offering Fraud (17[.]1%), and Manipulation (16[.]2%)."214 The
tips came from individuals located in all fifty states and many foreign
countries.2 15 Officials have indicated that two to three of the daily tips
coming to OMI through the WBP tend to be "high quality," often coming
from "competitors or high-level industry executives or managers that are
knowledgeable about how securities markets work."2 16 According to the
OWB's chief, tips have also come in from employees, former employees,
spouses, ex-spouses, in-house attorneys, compliance officers, and one
former CEO, among others.2 17
Other recent data on the WBP comes from the SEC's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), in a report the OIG submitted to Congress in
206 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(d).
207 See WBP 2013 Report, supra note 183.
208 Id. at 16.
209 Id. at 5.
21o Id. at 8.
211 Id. at 13. According to the report, OWB has posted 431 notices of covered action since the
program's inception. Id.
212 Id. at 14-15. Few details were provided about the cases which resulted in bounty awards, in an
effort to preserve the anonymity of the whistleblower involved.
213 Id. at 14.
214 Id. at 8.
215 Id. at 9-10.
216 Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, SEC Whistleblower Tip Rate: 7 A Day, ON WALL STREET (May 23,
2012), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/sec-whistleblower-sporkin-2679022-1.html.
217 SEC Actively Tracking Corporate Conduct that Might Constitute Informant Retaliation, [2012]
Sec. L. Daily (BNA) 12, at 13 (Oct. 11, 2012).
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January 2013.218 That report discusses the results of the OIG's
congressionally mandated performance audit of the WBP.2 19 As part of that
audit, the OIG conducted a statistical sampling of whistleblower TCRs
submitted between April 12, 2011 and September 30, 2012.220 Based on
that sampling, it found: on average, OMI conducted initial TCR reviews
within one day of receipt; 69% of TCRs received were deemed to require
"no further action";2 2 1 and TCRs that were deemed to require further action
were assigned to relevant enforcement personnel within ten days of receipt,
222
on average. The OIG concluded that the "SEC generally is prompt in
responding to information that is provided by whistleblowers, applications
for whistleblower awards, and in communicating with interested parties,"
but recommended that its internal controls be strengthened through the
adoption of performance metrics.223 The OIG also found that the WBP is
"clearly defined and user-friendly for users that have basic securities laws,
rules, and regulations knowledge," and has been well publicized by the
OWB. 224
C. Evaluating the Program ' Promise: Insular View
The WBP marks an important sea change in the SEC's relationship
with private informants. Prior to its creation, the only experience the SEC
had paying for tips was a little-used, and totally discretionary, insider
trading bounty program. 2 25 With change comes controversy, and the WBP
certainly has had its share of detractors. This Section attempts to structure
the current debate over the potential efficacy of the WBP. While that
debate has ignored the WBP's impact on the desirability of FOTM class
actions-the main focus of this Article-it is an important predicate to my
larger argument.
An evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the WBP must begin
with a definition of its purpose. One possible definition is "to increase the
218 See OIG Report, supra note 191.
219 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1848-49 (2010).
220 OIG Report, supra note 191, at 14.
221 Id. at 16. A TCR may be designated as not requiring further action because it is of low quality,
because it relates to a matter already under active investigation by the SEC, or because it is more
suitably investigated by another law enforcement agency. Id at 16 n.23.
222 Id. at 16.
223 Id. at v. The SEC has since adopted such metrics. See WBP 2013 Report, supra note 183, at 17-
18.
224 OIG Report, supra note 191, at v.
225 See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).
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number of high quality tips" related to securities fraud. 226 But that
definition is too narrow, for enhancing the number of high-quality tips is
not an end in itself. It is a means to better detect and, in turn, deter
securities fraud. And as explained earlier, deterring securities fraud is
desirable only insofar as it operates to enhance overall social welfare-that
is, only to the extent that the benefits of increased deterrence exceed the
costs of the legal regime.22 7 The potential effectiveness of the WBP is
discussed below with this broader social cost-benefit calculation in mind.
1. Social Benefits.-The WBP will have the laudable effect of
deterring securities fraud if it makes it more likely that fraudsters will be
caught. A rational corporate manager contemplating fraud would weigh the
benefits to him of committing fraud against the expected costs of being
caught, discounted by the likelihood of being caught. Thus, if the
likelihood of being caught goes up while the expected costs of being caught
remain the same, rational corporate officers will find fewer frauds
worthwhile. Increasing the likelihood of detection may also galvanize
directors and officers to take greater steps to prevent fraud by others within
the firm.228 The WBP will increase the probability of detection if it prompts
the submission of tips regarding frauds that would not otherwise have been
exposed. Even with respect to frauds that would have come to light absent
the WBP, the lure of a bounty might prompt earlier reporting; if so, the
program may serve to limit the damage caused by fraud by facilitating
quicker intervention to stop it.
It may seem obvious that the WBP would have the effects of
encouraging more tips and prompting quicker intervention to stop ongoing
frauds, but neither proposition has gone unchallenged. It has been argued,
for example, that the WBP may actually discourage reporting-perversely
leading to a lower probability of fraud detection-by "crowding out"
internal motivations to blow the whistle. 22 9 The assumption underlying the
WBP is that the lure of financial reward, as well as the promise of
confidentiality and strong retaliation protection, will alter the internal cost-
benefit calculation a potential whistleblower engages in when deciding
whether to report wrongdoing or remain silent. The costs of blowing the
whistle can be significant and include possible workplace retaliation and
226 The WBP technically extends to tips related to any securities law violation, but most of the
commentary surrounding the program has focused on its potential to detect fraud, and that is the focus
of this Article as well.
227 See supra Part I.B.2.a.
228 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
229 See, e.g., Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions,
6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 130 n.68 (2011); cf Diego G. Pardow, What Should We
Expect from the Dodd-Frank Bounty Program? (July 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2115964) (critically evaluating this claim).
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industry blacklisting; the benefits of reporting include any psychic
gratification that may come from exposing the wrongdoing as well as
possible avoidance of complicity in that wrongdoing and resultant liability
exposure. 2 3 0 By entitling whistleblowers to a sizeable financial reward,
protecting their confidentiality, and providing heightened protection against
retaliation, the WBP increases the benefits of reporting and decreases the
costs-hopefully tipping the scales in favor of reporting.231 But if the
promise of financial reward decreases the psychic benefits of reporting, it is
possible that the WBP could have the opposite effect.
While theoretically possible, there is no evidence that the WBP has
created such a crowding-out effect or that it will in the future. Financial
bounties have successfully increased detection in other regulatory areas,2 3 2
and the uptick in the number of high-quality tips the SEC has received in
the wake of the WBP indicates they are working in the securities context as
well.2 33 Although a recent experimental survey by Professors Yuval
Feldman and Orly Lobel supports a limited crowding-out effect attributable
230 In one whistleblowing study on corporate fraud, 82% of the nonanonymous whistleblowers
included in the sample alleged that they were "fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered
responsibilities" as a result of bringing the fraud to light. Dyck et al., supra note 104, at 2240. For a
comprehensive survey of studies done on whistleblower retaliation, see MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL.,
WHISTLE-BLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 101-30 (2008). See also Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G.
Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs,
1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1141, 1172-75 (discussing various losses whistleblowers may suffer through
retaliation); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by
the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REv. 73, 109-18 (considering
what factors motivate individuals to either blow the whistle or not come forward, including retaliation).
231 It has been asserted that "[i]nformants tip only when the discounted gains from doing so exceed
the discounted losses," and a "discounted gain is not the amount an informant could receive in return
for his information" but rather "the amount an informant legitimately expects to receive, discounted by
the likelihood that the amount will be reduced or not awarded at all." Ferziger & Currell, supra note
231, at 1171 (emphasis omitted). Prior bounty programs that made the payment of bounties entirely
discretionary on the part of the administering agency (such as the SEC's former insider trading bounty
program and the pre-1996 version of the IRS's bounty program) have been widely judged as
unsuccessful, perhaps because potential whistleblowers applied a deep discount to such uncertain
rewards. Learning from these earlier failures, Congress deliberately chose to make WBP bounties
nondiscretionary, and required that they total no less than 10% of collected sanctions in a covered
action. Of course, a potential whistleblower in the WBP continues to face uncertainty with respect to:
(1) whether a covered action will result from her tip; (2) whether the SEC will deem her to have
satisfied the eligibility criteria; (3) the amount of any award within the 10/-30% range; and
(4) whether she will have to share that award with other whistleblowers.
232 See Dyck et al., supra note 104, at 2246 (finding that employees revealed fraud in 41% of the
cases in the sample from the healthcare industry-a setting where qui tam suits under the False Claims
Act are available-but in only 14% of cases in the sample from industries where qui tam suits are not
available).
233 See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement at SEC Open
Meeting: Item 2-Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011) (available at www.sec.gov/news/
speech/201 1/spch052511 mls-item2.htm) ("[T]he quality of the tips we have received has been better
since Section 922 became law.").
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to financial rewards for whistleblowing, their results suggest the effect
takes hold only in situations where the misconduct being reported does not
evoke a high level of moral outrage and the promised bounties are small.234
The bounties promised by the WBP are large, by contrast, and securities
fraud-a scienter-based offense-should evoke significant moral outrage.
In any event, experimental surveys may not reliably predict how
individuals would respond to incentives in real world situations.23 5 Intuition
and experience tells us that large financial rewards work.
A more serious concern, voiced by many, is that the WBP will have
the effect of allowing frauds to persist longer than they otherwise would,
thus perversely increasing the social costs of fraud. This will occur, the
argument goes, because the WBP creates an incentive for whistleblowers to
bypass their companies' internal compliance departments in favor of direct
reporting to the SEC.236 Although the final rules sought to preserve the
attractiveness of internal reporting in a variety of ways discussed in Part
II.A, they do not include a requirement that a whistleblower first report
internally in order to be eligible for a bounty award. The Chamber of
Commerce and Institute for Legal Reform criticized this choice as a
decision to "put trial lawyer profits ahead of effective compliance and
corporate governance."2 37 These organizations issued a joint statement
warning that the absence of an internal reporting requirement:
will make it harder and slower to detect and stop corporate fraud - by
undermining the strong compliance systems set up under Sarbanes Oxley to
ensure companies take whistleblowers seriously. Armed with trial lawyers and
new large financial incentives to bypass these programs, whistleblowers will
go straight to the SEC with allegations of wrongdoing and keep companies in
the dark. This leaves expensive, robust compliance programs collecting dust,
while violations continue to fester, eroding shareholder value.238
234 See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1151, 1202
(2010).
235 See MICELI ET AL., supra note 230, at 26-32 (discussing the serious limitations for various
approaches to studying the predictors of whistleblowing, including experimental surveys).
236 See, e.g., Lisa M. Noller, A Modest Practitioner Proposal: Striking a Balance in Whistleblower
Lawsuits, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 129, 143-46 (raising this objection); Vishal Baloria et al., A Lobbying
Approach to Evaluating the Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Reform Act of 2010, at II
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1923310) (observing that
the issue most frequently addressed in comment letters related to the WBP was the lack of a
requirement of internal reporting).
237 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower
Rule Will Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs (May 25, 2011) (available at
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-will-
undermine-corporate-compliance).
238 Id. For a good discussion of the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on internal compliance programs, see
Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers,
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Concerns about undermining internal compliance programs led SEC
Commissioners Troy Paredes and Kathleen Casey to vote against the
adoption of the final rules.239
Early results indicate that, like the "crowding-out" concern, this fear
may be overblown. The OWB's chief has stated that a "significant
majority" of the whistleblowers who have come forward since the program
began reported that they used internal channels first.2 40 And the Quarterly
Corporate Fraud Index 24 1 indicates that internal fraud reporting has actually
increased in the wake of the WBP.242 This may be because, in response to
concerns about the WBP's potential impact on internal reporting, many
firms proactively "shored up their anti-retaliation policies and tried to
communicate more effectively to employees the organization's renewed
commitment to internal reporting processes."243 Moreover, even when a
2006 BYU L. REv. 1107. For contrary views regarding the impact of the WBP on such programs, see
Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know It, or an
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement?: Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-
Frank Act's Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1061 (2012); Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions: Written Testimony Submitted to the U.S. House Committee on Financial
Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises (unpublished
manuscript) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1844586).
239 See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open Meeting to
Adopt Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 2 1F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2011/spch05251lklcitem2.htm; Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/20 1 1/spch05251 1tapitem2.htm.
240 Jaime Guerrero, Most SEC Whistleblowers Tell Company First, INSIDECOUNSEL (March 28,
2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/03/28/regulatory-most-sec-whistleblowers-tell-company-fi.
This is consistent with documented whistleblower behavior in other regulatory contexts. See MICELI ET
AL., supra note 230, at 9 ("Many studies have shown that nearly all [whistleblowers] who use external
channels do so after first using internal channels.").
241 The index is compiled from actual incidents reported by clients of The Network, a company that
describes itself as "the leader in providing integrated governance, risk and compliance ... solutions that
help organizations mitigate risk, achieve compliance and ultimately, create better, more ethical
workplaces"; among other products, The Network offers clients a confidential hotline for employees to
report suspected law violations. See About The Network, Inc., THE NETWORK, http://www.tnwinc.com/
about (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
242 "Fraud-related incidents reflected in the Fraud Index include reports on corruption, theft,
accounting and audit irregularities, misuse of assets, conflicts of interest, and violations of [the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act], UK anti-bribery and SEC legislation." Press Release, The Network, The
Network & BDO Consulting Release 2nd Quarter 2012 Findings: Quarterly Corporate Fraud Index
(Sept. 25, 2012) (available at http://www.tnwinc.com/1 553/corporate-fraud-index/).
243 Yin Wilczek, Employees' Internal Fraud Reports Rise Even in Wake of SEC Whistleblower
Program, 7 BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT 330, 331 (2012) (quoting Luis Ramos, CEO of The
Network); see also Shannon Kay Quigley, Comment, Whistleblower Tug-of-War: Corporate Attempts
to Secure Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided by the
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whistleblower does bypass internal channels, nothing prevents the SEC
from informing the whistleblower's employer that a suspected law
violation has been reported to allow for swift internal investigation (so long
as the SEC does not reveal the whistleblower's identity). Indeed, the SEC
has indicated that "in most cases, upon receiving a whistleblower tip, its
staff would contact a corporation and describe the allegations, giving the
firm the chance to investigate the matter itself."24 4
Some also contend that the WBP creates incentives for whistleblowers
to delay reporting fraud until it grows severe enough to warrant at least $1
million in sanctions-the minimum amount needed for a "covered
action." 24 5 Delay may indeed be a logical choice if it is clear that no
covered action will result if the fraud is reported immediately. But the point
at which a fraud will result in a covered action is likely hard for a potential
whistleblower to predict, and delay carries with it considerable risks,
making it a dangerous strategy. As explained in Part II.A, if the SEC learns
of information from another person before the whistleblower reports it to
the SEC, to certain other governmental authorities, or through his
employer's internal compliance procedures, the whistleblower will fail the
originality requirement (unless he is the "original source" of the other
person's tip), and thus be rendered ineligible for a bounty.246 A
whistleblower will also fail the "voluntariness" requirement if, before he
makes his report, the SEC or certain other authorities request related
information from him.247 And even if he can meet the originality and
voluntariness requirements, if the SEC has already opened an investigation
into the misconduct by the time a whistleblower submits his information,
the whistleblower will face the more stringent "significant contribution"
test for determining whether his tip "led to" a covered action.248 Finally,
unreasonable delay in reporting may adversely affect the size of the bounty
awarded by the SEC, within the 1 0 /o-3 0% range.24 9 Thus, the WBP creates
fairly strong incentives for whistleblowers to report promptly.
Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255 (2012) (suggesting modifications to compliance
programs to encourage internal reporting in response to the WBP).
244 Rapp, supra note 238. A recent empirical study shows that firms that lobbied against the
adoption of the WBP had significantly weaker internal compliance programs relative to a sample of
nonlobbying firms, a finding the study's authors view as inconsistent with the claim that the WBP will
undermine internal compliance programs. See Baloria et al., supra note 236, at 20, 23-24.
245 See, e.g., John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 367, 371 (2011); Rapp, supra note 230, at 93-94.
246 See supra Part II.A.2.
247 See supra Part II.A.1.
248 See supra Part II.A.3.
249 See supra Part II.A.5. Negative consequences also follow from any attempt on the part of a
whistleblower to hinder an-internal or external probe that may expose the wrongdoing. See supra notes
128, 180.
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Apart from its impact on the probability and timing of detection, the
WBP might also increase deterrence by raising the expected costs a
fraudster faces if detected. As the Harry Markopolos-Bernie Madoff saga
painfully illustrates, a meritorious tip to the SEC does not always result in
investigation and punishment.2 5 0 The WBP now gives tipsters (and their
contingency-fee lawyers) a strong financial stake in monitoring and
encouraging SEC follow-through. The WBP is also subject to ongoing
congressional oversight, with the OWB obligated to report to Congress
annually on its response to whistleblower complaints.25 1 Of course, poorer
SEC follow-through is also a possible result of the WBP, if it prompts a
deluge of tips that overwhelm the SEC's processing capabilities. But with
the creation of OMI and the revamped TCR System, the SEC appears well
equipped to handle the influx of information, and the recent OIG
performance audit suggests it is doing a fairly good job processing tips so
far.252 The SEC can also lean on whistleblowers and their counsel as well
as special committees at implicated corporations for assistance in
investigations. Thus, the WBP may work to increase not only the likelihood
that fraudsters will be detected, but also the likelihood that they will be
punished if detected.
It is important to emphasize that the long-term success of the WBP in
eliciting tips will depend on how often the SEC is perceived to pay out
bounties. Bounties are available only in "covered actions"-i.e., actions
involving financial penalties in excess of $1 million-and pay out only as a
percentage of sanctions actually collected. Some contend that "SEC
enforcement trends for financial statement misrepresentation are unlikely to
provide adequate incentives for whistleblowers to come forward with
evidence of financial statement fraud."253 This is debatable. In a working
paper, Professors Maria Correia and Michael Klausner study a sample of
297 resolved SEC enforcement actions filed between 2000 and 2011
involving firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.2 54 They find
that the SEC imposed a mean monetary penalty of $87.2 million (median
$12 million) on corporate defendants in 23% of the total cases (68 out of
250 Luke Roosevelt Homblower, Outsourcing Fraud Detection: The Analyst as Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower, 6J. BUS. & TECH. L. 287, 312-18 (2011) (telling the story of Harry Markopolos's
unsuccessful efforts to get the SEC to pursue the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
251 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
252 The OIG Report suggests that the SEC is processing tips in a timely manner-it does not speak
to the quality of the screening being done. See supra Part II.B.
253 See Tristan Favro, Financial Statement Misrepresentation & the SEC Whistleblower Program:
Rethinking Whistleblower Incentives Without Qui Tam Actions 27 (Feb. 26, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also Rapp, supra note 230, at 93-95 (raising similar concerns).
254 Maria Correia & Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions "Supplemental" to SEC
Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis (May 15, 2012) (unpublished working paper) (available at
http://recanati-bs.tau.ac.ilEng/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Correia.pdf).
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297) and a mean monetary penalty of $29.7 million (median $265,000) on
individual defendants in 69% of the total cases (205 out of 297).255 It is
unclear whether this level of sanctioning will be high enough to elicit tips,
but if the confidentiality and antiretaliation provisions of the WBP succeed
in keeping the costs of whistleblowing low, it may prove sufficient. If it
does not, however, the SEC could always adjust by ratcheting up the
sanctions it imposes on culpable individuals and, if necessary, on corporate
defendants.2 56 Increasing corporate penalties could, however, introduce
new costs-a possibility I address in the next subsection.
To be sure, to believe that the WBP will succeed in increasing fraud
detection, one must at the very least trust that the SEC will not intentionally
sabotage the program by targeting sanctions below the $1 million mark, or
by foregoing enforcement altogether. This is an easy leap to make, in my
view. As mentioned above, the WBP will be subject to ongoing
congressional oversight. It will also be closely scrutinized by the media,
whistleblowers, and the whistleblower bar. Thus, even if the SEC wanted
to thwart the program's success by altering (or failing to adjust) its
sanctioning or enforcement practices-something that is contradicted by
the SEC's enthusiastic embrace of the program-it is unlikely to do so. 2 57
2. Social Costs.-All told, it seems likely that the WBP will help to
reduce the social harm caused by securities fraud through enhanced
deterrence. The question remains, however: At what cost? Administering
the WBP will undoubtedly consume considerable government resources, as
will the additional investigations it prompts. Potentially more onerous,
however, are a variety of more indirect costs the program might produce.
For example, some fear that the program will elicit a high number of
nonmeritorious tips. 2 58 While it is unlikely that the WBP will produce many
tips that are outright fabrications (the requirement that whistleblowers
255 Id. at tbl.5. Additional amounts were paid in disgorgement, and these amounts would also count
toward bounties under the WBP. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(4) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(e) (2013).
256 If the problem proved intractable, reforms might be considered to make whistleblowing more
lucrative. For example, the SEC could be instructed to assign a monetary value to nonmonetary
sanctions (such as director and officer bars) when determining whether a covered action exists and
calculating bounty awards. Tristan Favro has recommended several additional possibilities, including
counting clawback payments, lowering the $1 million threshold for what counts as a covered action, or
raising the percentage of sanctions that may be awarded to a whistleblower above the current 30% cap.
See Favro, supra note 233, at 36-40.
257 See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Blount & Markel, supra note 238, at 1041-42; Lucienne M. Hartmann, Whistle While
You Work: The Fairytale-Like Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of
"Greedy, " the Eighth Dwarf 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1306-08 (2011); Holger Fleischer & Klaus
Ulrich Schmolke, Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers in European Capital Markets Law? Legal
Policy Considerations on the Reform of the Market Abuse Regime 9 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 189, 2012) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2124678).
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submit their tips under penalty of perjury, as well as the requirement that
the SEC bring a covered action based on the tip before a bounty may be
awarded, seems a sufficient guard against this), the lure of a large bount
could motivate individuals to view honest conduct as suspicious.2
Because a whistleblower's identity will be kept confidential if the tip does
not pan out, and retaliation protection kicks in so long as the whistleblower
had a "reasonable belief' that their tip related to a "possible" securities law
violation,2 6 0 reporting is a sensible strategy even when there is only a small
chance observed conduct is unlawful.261
If mistaken tips become commonplace-something the recent OIG
report suggests may be happening262-the ultimate damage they cause will
depend on how efficient personnel at OMI (and, if the tips are made
internally, in corporate compliance departments) become at screening for
them. If such personnel become adept at doing so, disposing of mistaken
tips early and privately, the costs of the problem may be fairly contained.
This is not to say that such costs will necessarily be trivial-the specter of
trigger-happy whistleblowers may foster a general atmosphere of distrust
and suspicion amongst coworkers, which can negatively affect a firm's
productivity.6  But if mistaken tips frequently lead to serious
investigations, the costs will be much more substantial. These costs could
include considerable legal fees, unwarranted reputational damage to firms
and individuals, as well as undesirable ex ante effects on corporate
behavior. For example, companies might choose to avoid profit-
maximizing transactions that are legal but thought likely to arouse
whistleblower suspicion. Firm managers might also become hesitant to
share information outside a small cohort of trusted colleagues, to the
detriment of the firm's operations, or may spend resources that could be put
to more valuable use assuring employees of the legality of the firm's
behavior.
259 This is a particular risk when the boundaries of the legal prohibition are vague or uncertain, as is
the case with securities fraud. See supra note 66. It is even more of a risk with violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act See Heidi L. Hansberry, In Spite oflts Good Intentions, the Dodd-Frank Act Has
Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2012).
260 See supra note 199.
261 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam,
WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40-43) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstractid=2237658) (exploring how reducing the cost of blowing the whistle can encourage weak
tips, to the detriment of deterrence).
262 See OIG Report, supra note 191, at 16 (reporting that 69% of sampled tips were designated by
the SEC as not warranting further action).
263 See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 99 (observing that "'high heat' monitoring poses some
inchoate risk to morale and productivity that is extraordinarily difficult to measure but potentially quite
large").
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Some may worry that even meritorious tips could lead to unintended
consequences if the WBP encourages the SEC to rely more heavily on
corporate sanctions than it otherwise would. As mentioned above, the long-
term success of the WBP in eliciting tips will depend on how often the SEC
is perceived to pay out bounties. And bounties can be paid out only in
actions involving financial penalties in excess of $1 million, and only to the
extent they are actually collected. If culpable individuals cannot pay
sufficiently high fines to sustain attractive bounty payments, the SEC may
be tempted to impose sanctions on their more deep-pocketed corporate
employers. As discussed in Part I.B.2.b., there exists a traditional
deterrence justification for vicarious corporate liability premised on the
notion that a firm's owners should be forced to fully internalize the costs of
employee delicts. But that argument loses force in cases involving fraud-
on-the-market by publicly traded companies. This is because the diversified
shareholders who own the bulk of such companies naturally internalize the
social costs of secondary market fraud; moreover, when public companies
pay in FOTM suits, most of the money is returned to those same investors.
As I explained, FOTM suits may nevertheless serve a useful function if the
attorneys' fees they generate induce the class action bar to assist in fraud
detection. If the SEC imposes corporate fines on public companies for
fraud-on-the-market as a way to sustain the WBP, a similar logic applies:
most of the fines will be paid back to shareholders through a fair funds
distribution,264 and the amount siphoned off to pay the bounties may be
worth the increased fraud detection the WBP produces. So what, then, is
the problem? The answer is that corporate sanctions can also produce
undesirable results if they push firms into financial distress, or if they cause
boards to overinvest in fraud prevention measures or to reduce their self-
policing efforts. Unlike FOTM plaintiffs, the SEC often forbids defendant
firms from using insurance to fund settlements, so both threats may loom
larger in this context.
There are several answers to these concerns. First, the SEC may in fact
be able to collect sufficiently high sanctions from individual defendants to
make the WBP work without resorting to corporate fines.265 Second, the
level of corporate fines that might be required to make the program work
would likely be far too small to have a noticeable impact on the operations
of most public companies,266 and would be dwarfed in any event by the
264 See supra note 9.
265 See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
266 Indeed, corporate fines far smaller than those imposed by the SEC in the decade preceding the
WBP would likely suffice. See Correia & Klausner, supra note 255. For example, a fine of $3.33
million would produce a bounty of between $333,000 and $1 million. Of course, rational
whistleblowers would discount this figure by the probability their tip would not produce an enforcement
action, that the SEC would choose not to impose the penalty, that they would fail to meet the criteria for
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market penalties the firm would face.267 Professor Arlen has argued that
because the market penalty firms incur for securities fraud is so severe it
may dissuade corporate agents from self-policing for fraud in the same way
she has argued the risk of respondeat superior liability may do So.268 The
solution, she posits, is for the government to threaten firms that fail to
engage in reasonable policing efforts with sufficiently high fines so that
policing is attractive, notwithstanding the heightened risk of detection,
while absolving firms that demonstrate reasonable policing efforts from
corporate liability entirely.269 The high fines imposed on nonpolicing firms
would impact the value of their corporate managers' firm-specific
investments and potentially prompt other forms of shareholder discipline
by signaling to the market that the "managers failed either to report
suspected wrongdoing or to cooperate fully with the government's
investigation"; 270 a positive signal would presumably be sent regarding the
managers of those firms that escaped sanction, lessening the market
penalty. The government's sanctioning policy would therefore help to align
managerial incentives with those of diversified shareholders. This type of
high-fine-no-fine strategy might work well to entice whistleblowing,
especially if a lottery mentality takes hold in the whistleblower community.
But if more frequent corporate penalties are needed to maintain
whistleblower incentives than would be called for under Professor Arlen's
preferred policy, a solution would be for the SEC to impose relatively
modest (albeit bounty-generating) corporate fines in cases against firms
that engaged in reasonable policing efforts, and to allow those fines to be
paid for with insurance, while pursuing a high-fine-no-insurance approach
against non-policing firms.
Others have also warned that the WBP will have a deleterious effect
on auditor-client and attorney-client relationships, eroding trust and in turn
inhibiting the candor that is necessary to make those relationships work
effectively.271 As explained in Part II.A, auditors and attorneys are
generally ineligible to claim bounty awards for providing tips that implicate
clients.272 But their ineligibility is subject to large exceptions.27 3 Finally,
an award, and that they may have to share their award with others. But the lure of a big payout may be
more likely to produce a lottery mentality than such reasoned calculations, at least if the WBP succeeds
in keeping the costs of whistleblowing low.
267 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
268 See Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at http://weblaw.usc.edulassets/docs/Arlen.pdf); see also supra note 68.
269 Arlen, supra note 268, at 36-39.
270 Id at 38.
271 See, e.g., Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 157, at 12.
272 See supra Part II.A.4.
273 See supra Part II.A.4.
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some also warn that the WBP's antiretaliation provision will create a
human relations nightmare as firms find themselves hamstrung to fire
underperforming, but whistleblowing, employees. 27 4
3. Striking the Right Balance.-Do the potential benefits of the WBP
exceed its potential costs? At the risk of disappointment, I do not claim to
know. Whether, on net, the WBP will increase social welfare is a question
no one can answer with certainty. The benefits and costs discussed above,
while potentially very real, are also notoriously difficult to observe and
measure. Individuals with different intuitions as to the level of undetected
securities fraud plaguing the U.S. capital markets may view the balance
differently. What I can say with some degree of confidence is that the
program is likely to increase fraud detection, and that the SEC has done a
reasonable job in trying to ensure that its costs do not dwarf its benefits.
Whether the SEC has optimized the program is far more debatable. A
variety of different choices could have been made in calibrating the final
rules. The SEC could have precluded attorneys and auditors from
recovering bounties for providing tips relating to their clients without
exception. It could have made the standard for invoking retaliation
protection more demanding than a "reasonable belief' of a "possible"
securities law violation. It could have required internal reporting as a
prerequisite to recovery, absent strong evidence of a corrupt corporate
compliance department. Similarly, Congress could have made different
choices in the statute about, for example, whistleblower confidentiality, the
determination of what counts as a "covered action," or the range of
permitted bounty payments. I could go on. Time and close monitoring will
shed better light on the choices Congress and the SEC did make and
perhaps provide grounds for future revisions to the program. We must wait
and see.
A far more tractable question concerns the impact of the WBP, now
that we have it, on other aspects of the United States' securities fraud
deterrence regime-and in particular on the controversial FOTM class
action. The next Part turns to this broader question, which has been
neglected in the debate over the WBP, and suggests a stark answer.
III. HOW THE BOUNTY PROGRAM UNDERMINES THE CASE FOR
FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET CLASS ACTIONS
As discussed in Part I, FOTM suits stood on a weak foundation even
before the WBP. The shareholder-funded settlements FOTM suits produce
do not advance compensatory goals. Nor do these payments advance
deterrence goals, at least not in the way respondeat superior liability is
274 See, e.g., Blount & Markel, supra note 238, at 1042.
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traditionally thought to. If the FOTM class action can be justified, it is as a
sort of mandatory corporate governance device: rather than shareholders
monitoring the fraud deterrence efforts of management and the SEC
directly, FOTM suits allow them to outsource these functions to the class
action bar. Prior to the adoption of the WBP, the efficiency of this device
was far from clear given the small percentage of FOTM suits that actually
revealed original information about securities fraud. In the wake of the
WBP, the case for FOTM suits is substantially weaker and, likely,
unsustainable. This is because the WBP can be expected to decrease the
already limited informational benefits of FOTM suits, while at the same
time increasing their costs-assuming, that is, that the program works to
enhance fraud detection. But even if it does not, the WBP still undermines
the case for FOTM suits. As discussed in the next Part, adding a qui tam
feature to a dysfunctional WBP would be preferable to retaining FOTM
suits.
A. Reduced Benefits
As explained in Part I.B.2.b. 1., the primary way that FOTM suits may
aid in deterrence is by assisting in fraud detection. And given that
plaintiffs' lawyers are outsiders to the corporation with no access to legal
tools of discovery until after their FOTM complaints survive a motion to
dismiss, their skills in fraud detection must stem from one of two sources:
(1) their ability to get current or former insiders to talk; or (2) their learned
ability to analyze publicly available information to discern potential
frauds.2 75 The WBP is now poised to cover much of the same detection
terrain.
First, it is highly likely that yesterday's FOTM-suit confidential
informant will become today's WBP tipster; if this happens, it means that
the already small percentage of corporate frauds exposed through private
litigation 27 6 will get even smaller. Current and former corporate insiders
with information about potential securities law violations have much more
to gain, and much less to lose, by submitting a tip to the SEC than by
providing information to a FOTM class action attorney. Submitting a tip
leads to the possibility of earning a substantial bounty. By contrast, FOTM
275 Between the two, the former source is likely more significant. As Professor Gideon Mark has
explained, under the PSLRA, plaintiffs
must plead their cases with particularity, but they are generally barred from obtaining discovery to
bolster their allegations until after all motions to dismiss have been decided. The result has been
almost universal reliance by plaintiffs in class action securities complaints on information
provided by confidential witnesses. Allegations based on such information often are the only
specific allegations in a complaint supporting a claim of securities fraud.
Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 554 (2011) (emphasis
added) (citations ommitted).
276 See Dyck et al., supra note 104.
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class action attorneys cannot pay confidential informants for their
information without compromising their integrity as potential witnesses
and deponents, 277 and their pro rata share of any settlement payment will
likely be much smaller than their expected bounty payment under the WBP
(assuming they are even class members).278 Moreover, subject to limited
exceptions, the SEC is legally obligated to keep a tipster's identity
confidential until the point of a trial (which will likely never occur), and
tipsters also enjoy strong legal protection against retaliation, including the
right to sue for reinstatement and double back pay.279 Providing
information to a FOTM class action attorney, by contrast, comes with no
comparable safeguards. It is therefore logical to assume that insiders with
credible information about securities fraud who might heretofore have
assisted a FOTM attorney by serving as a confidential informant (and many
others who would not have) will now choose to participate in the WBP.
The second way that FOTM lawyers may assist in fraud detection is
by utilizing their own developed expertise to identify frauds based on
publicly available information. It is likely that this form of fraud detection
will also migrate to the WBP. Under the WBP, corporate "outsiders" whose
tips are based on an "independent analysis" of publicly available
information may be treated as having provided the SEC with "original
information" and thus may be eligible for bounties. 2 80 A class action lawyer
(or group of lawyers) with this sort of fraud detection ability could
therefore profit from it through personal participation in the WBP. The
WBP's expansive notion of original information creates incentives for
other market actors with similar expertise to participate, and for new
entrants to develop such expertise in the hopes of profiting from the
281program. In any of these eventualities, the potential for FOTM class
actions to expose otherwise undetected frauds will be reduced.282
277 See Mark, supra note 275, at 571 ("The absence of remuneration significantly enhances the
credibility of confidential witnesses in class action securities litigation.").
278 See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 60 (2002) (citation omitted)
(observing that whistleblowers "are not eligible to participate in a class action unless they happen to
gain class status by owning stock in the security at issue" and that a "class member who incurred the
professional and personal risks to reveal inside information regarding the wrongdoing alleged by the
class would receive nothing for incurring these risks; all this whistleblower would get is a pro rata
share, based upon the amount of stock held").
279 See supra Part II.A.7.
280 See supra Part II.A.2.
281 For example, it might prompt some to develop more sophisticated techniques for detecting
accounting fraud based on publicly available financial data. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Predicting
Material Accounting Misstatements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 17 (2011) (developing a model that
produces a scaled probability (F-Score) of earnings management based on financial statement
variables).
282 One may object that lawyers will have weaker financial incentives to participate as
whistleblowers in the WBP than to file FOTM suits. This is not at all obvious. A recent report from
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As explained in Part I.B.2.b.2, beyond detection, FOTM suits may
assist in fraud deterrence through their disciplining influence on the SEC.
The WBP also reduces the need for FOTM suits to serve this purpose. The
WBP creates a new set of SEC watchdogs with incentives to monitor the
agency in a more direct fashion than FOTM lawyers-namely,
whistleblowers and their counsel. These parties have strong financial
motives to ensure that the SEC responds to the specific information brought
to its attention about securities law violations, and that the SEC is
aggressive in its enforcement and sanctioning activity. They can be
expected to complain to the media or Congress if the SEC fails on either
front. Dodd-Frank also requires ongoing congressional scrutiny of the
SEC's administration of the WBP, including the commission of an annual
report in which the SEC must describe how it has responded to
whistleblower tips.2 83
B. Increased Costs
While the benefits of FOTM suits can be expected to decrease in the
wake of the WBP, their costs can be expected to rise. This is because any
increase in the number of SEC enforcement actions involving large public
companies brought because of the program will also likely increase the
number of FOTM suits filed. These sorts of "piggyback" or "me, too" suits
impose real costs, but promise none of the social benefits discussed in Part
I.B.2.b: They are unlikely to result in the public revelation of new
information about the underlying fraud,284 and they do not help to
"discipline" the SEC because they come about in situations where the SEC
has already done its job.
Cornerstone Research shows that the mean settlement amount in securities class actions from 1996-
2011 was $55.2 million (median $8.3 million). Ryan & Simmons, supra note 31, at 3. This compares to
the mean $87.2 million (median $12 million) in sanctions imposed on public companies in SEC actions
filed from 2000-2011, as reported by Correia and Klausner. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying
text. To be sure, securities class actions result in settlement at higher rates than SEC investigations
result in the imposition of corporate sanctions, but providing a tip to the SEC through the WBP is
dramatically less expensive and risky than is litigating a class action lawsuit. In any case, the
appropriate question is not whether participation in the WBP will be as profitable as bringing FOTM
suits, but whether it will be sufficiently profitable to make participation worthwhile. There is little
reason to believe that attorneys' fees in FOTM suits are currently calibrated to produce the optimal
level of private investment in fraud detection.
283 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. The first two reports, unfortunately, have been
rather skimpy in the information they provide. See supra notes 183-84. Congress should demand
greater detail in future reports.
284 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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As noted previously, many scholars have long doubted that the
benefits of FOTM suits outweigh their costs, but have stopped short of
advocating for their abolition due to residual empirical uncertainty. If the
WBP decreases the benefits and increases the costs of FOTM suits even
marginally, the program should embolden these scholars to call for more
radical reforms. Even those who felt confident about the social value of
FOTM suits in the pre-WBP world should feel compelled to reevaluate
their position: if the WBP works as intended, it will leave little for FOTM
suits to do, except generate deadweight costs. To be fair, that is one big
"if." Some may doubt that the WBP will in fact work effectively to
enhance fraud detection, as the foregoing analysis assumes. A common
critique of the SEC is that the agency underperforms due to resource
constraints or bureaucratic pathologies short of actual corruption.2 85 If, for
either reason, the SEC does not effectively investigate the credible
whistleblower tips it receives, or bring covered actions sufficient to attract
them, the WBP-and fraud deterrence-will suffer, as will the WBP-based
case for the abolition of FOTM suits.
As suggested by my discussion in Part II.C, I am hopeful that the
WBP and accompanying reforms to the enforcement division (including the
creation of OMI and the new TCR system) will make the SEC a more
effective agency. Although the SEC may have more work to do in the wake
of the WBP, it will also have better information. It can lean on special
committees at implicated firms to help it evaluate the volumes of tips it
receives, and to investigate tips that are deemed credible. The SEC can also
lean on whistleblowers and, perhaps most importantly, their counsel.
Whistleblower counsel may prove highly valuable to the SEC, for repeat
player attorneys may come to serve as a signal of tip quality.286 Numerous
whistleblower practice groups have popped up at highly regarded
285 Those who view the SEC as a fundamentally corrupt agency, bent on protecting fraudsters at the
expense of the U.S. capital markets might expect the SEC to sabotage the program (by burying tips,
refusing to bring covered actions, etc.). If this were to happen, then obviously the WBP would have
little to no effect on fraud deterrence, and hence would have little to no impact on the FOTM suit cost-
benefit calculation. Few, if any, informed observers take this view of the SEC, however, and it is one
that this Article will not entertain. Most believe that SEC personnel are dedicated public servants or at
the very least that their selfish motivations are kept in check by various forces, such as congressional
oversight and investor and media scrutiny.
286 See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1257-63 (2012) (discussing the potential advantages of a
specialized bar, including signaling of case quality as well as the potential disadvantages); Rapp, supra
note 230, at 121 (observing that whistleblower counsel may "serve a valuable screening role by helping
to weed out those cases that are unlikely to lead to successful enforcement action").
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plaintiffs'-side securities law firms in the wake of the WBP, reportedly
offering to represent whistleblowers for a 20%-30% contingency fee.
But not everyone will share my optimism. Some may worry that
whistleblower representation would prove unprofitable if the opportunity to
bring a parallel FOTM class action were eliminated, or that lawyers might
opt to pursue a high-volume portfolio model of whistleblower
representation 28 7-either eventuality would dash the hope that
whistleblower counsel will aid the SEC in its administration of the WBP by
serving as a signal of tip quality. It is also possible that the SEC will be too
overwhelmed to effectively administer the program, even with the
assistance of corporate special committees, whistleblowers, and
whistleblower counsel. The SEC might also ignore tips related to fraud-on-
the-market in favor of tips relating to less important but easier to win
claims, like reporting violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
288(FCPA). Even wise case prioritization by the SEC may leave some
credible tips unaddressed, and hence some frauds unexposed.
The next Part shows why the WBP has important implications for the
FOTM class action debate, even if the pessimists prove right.
IV. THE IDEA OF A QuI TAM SAFETY VALVE
Although a dysfunctional WBP might not justify the outright
elimination of private Rule 1Ob-5 enforcement, it nevertheless lays the
ground work for its transformation: replacing FOTM class actions with a
WBP qui tam provision would result in a marked improvement over the
status quo. This Part sketches how such a qui tam feature might operate,
and demonstrates its superiority as a private enforcement device relative to
FOTM suits.289
287 See Engstrom, supra note 286, at 1260, 1304, 1313 (noting that "specialized enforcers may
come to 'speculate' in enforcement efforts or become 'filing mills,"' but finding no empirical evidence
of filing mill behavior in the FCA qui tam context); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill
Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1491-503 (2009).
288 See generally Hansberry, supra note 259 (arguing that the WBP will create an FCPA
"monster").
289 Scholars have raised the idea of adding a qui tam provision to the securities laws in the past. See
Bucy, supra note 278, at 76; Casey & Niblett, supra note 261, at 42-46; Favro, supra note 253, at 40;
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate
and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007) [hereinafter Beyond Protection];
Rapp, supra note 230, at 78; Velikonja, supra note 43, at 1951; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(d)(1)(G), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848-49
(2010) (ordering the OlG to study whether adding a qui tam provision to the WBP would be desirable).
Scholars have also recognized the analogy between FOTM class actions and qui tam litigation. See Jill
E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167
(1997). Some have gone further to observe that qui tam litigation has advantages over FOTM class
actions as a method of promoting deterrence. See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra, at 100; Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by
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A. What It Might Look Like
Most readers will associate qui tam litigation with the False Claims
Act (FCA), a statute dating back to the Civil War era that prohibits fraud on
the federal government. 29 0 The FCA permits private parties who possess
original information about violations, dubbed "relators," to sue on behalf of
the government and recover a bounty for their efforts. 2 9 1 The relator first
files a complaint in court under seal and serves it only on the government;
the Department of Justice (DOJ) then has a period of time in which to
decide "whether to terminate or settle the case out from under the relator,
intervene and take 'primary responsibility' for the litigation of the case, or
decline to intervene and allow the relator to proceed alone." 292 If the DOJ
declines to intervene, the relator earns 25%-30% of any recovery.293 That
amount drops to 15/o-25% in the case of DOJ intervention.294
Nevertheless, relators much prefer the DOJ to intervene because it vastly
improves the odds of recovery. 29 5 By some metrics, the FCA has been a
huge success: it has produced "some seven thousand cases since 1986 with
judgments now approaching three billion dollars annually." 296
Whistleblowers, 15 NEXuS 55, 59 (2010); see also Bucy, supra note 278, at 68 (arguing generally that
qui tam mechanisms possess advantages relative to class actions as methods of private enforcement of
public law); Rose, supra note 41, at 1354-58 (suggesting reforms that would grant the SEC greater
power to oversee FOTM class actions, which would make them more closely resemble qui tam suits).
In a 1996 article, Professor Janet Cooper Alexander argued for replacing the out-of-pocket measure of
damages in FOTM suits with civil penalties, mentioning replacing class actions with qui tam litigation
as one possible way to effect that change. See Alexander, supra note 36, at 1516-18. But this is the first
Article to truly develop the theoretical case for replacing FOTM suits with a qui tam mechanism, and to
lay out how the WBP could be amended to facilitate such a change.
290 For an overview of the FCA, see Engstrom, supra note 286, at 1269-74.
291 Specifically, the suit cannot be "based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a
civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a
party," and is subject to dismissal if "substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the
action or claim were publicly disclosed" in certain government proceedings or in the news media
(unless the relator voluntarily informed the government of the information prior to its public disclosure
or has "knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions"). 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3)4) (2012).
292 David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of
DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1689, 1711
(2013).
29 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
294 Id. § 3730(d)(1).
295 The likelihood of recovery in intervened cases is roughly 90%, as is the likelihood of no
recovery in nonintervened cases. See Engstrom, supra note 292, at 1720; see also David Kwok,
Coordinated Private and Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence Under Qui Tam 12 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.
cgi?dbname=ALEA201O0&paper id=375) ("[T]he cases in which the DOJ is involved have higher
impositions than those without DOJ participation.").
296 Engstrom, supra note 286, at 1246.
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The qui tam addition to the WBP that I imagine would operate
somewhat differently from the FCA, relying heavily on the infrastructure
already created by the WBP and, to an extent, built up around FOTM class
actions. Instead of filing complaints under seal in court and serving them
on the government, as do FCA relators, WBP whistleblowers would
continue to file tip forms pursuant to existing procedures. After a
designated period of time had elapsed from the date of submission, the SEC
would be required to report to the whistleblower whether: (1) the matter
remained under investigation; (2) the SEC determined that there is
insufficient evidence of wrongdoing to warrant an enforcement action or
qui tam litigation related to the tip; (3) the SEC had chosen to bring an
enforcement action related to the tip; or (4) that although the SEC was not
pursuing an enforcement action, qui tam litigation is permitted.
In the first scenario, the SEC would be obligated to provide
subsequent reports of a similar nature at periodic intervals, until the
investigation concluded. In the second scenario, qui tam litigation would be
barred. The third scenario would play out just as it would today. Thus, if a
"covered action" resulted from the SEC's enforcement efforts, the
whistleblower could apply for a bounty according to the steps described in
Part II.A.6. Professors Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett have argued
that filing a qui tam lawsuit should be the only path to a bounty, because
the added litigation costs to whistleblowers would help to screen out
frivolous tips. 9 Requiring a whistleblower to file suit in order to be
entitled to a bounty, as in a qui tam suit brought under the FCA, may
indeed be an effective way to decrease the number of low quality tips. But
it might also discourage high quality tips by parties who are not interested
in such an undertaking, or who have important information that may not
alone suffice to state a claim, but which may prove helpful to a larger
investigation. Thus, preserving an opportunity for nonlitigating tipsters to
recover a bounty is important.
In the fourth scenario, whistleblowers would have the option of filing
a qui tam action. If no whistleblower chose to do so within a designated
period of time, the SEC would remain free to bring an enforcement action
at a later date (subject, of course, to the underlying statute of limitations).
If, however, a qui tam action were brought, it would bar later litigation by
the SEC under general principles of claim preclusion.298 The parties to the
297 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 261, at 42-46.
298 As has been observed in the FCA context, this can create opportunities for collusive settlements.
See, e.g., Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (warning that "a
relator can boost the value of settlement by bargaining away claims on behalf of the United States").
This may seem particularly troublesome insofar as qui tam litigation may produce corporate settlements
that serve to release culpable individual defendants from liability without monetary contribution. See
infra note 307 and accompanying text. This problem could be mitigated by requiring the SEC to weigh
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qui tam litigation would be required to serve copies of all pleadings on the
SEC, and, as discussed further below, the SEC would have the opportunity
to weigh in at various points in the litigation. The SEC would not, however,
have the option of intervening as a plaintiff alongside the whistleblower, as
does the DOJ under the FCA. This approach has the benefit of streamlining
enforcement efforts, and would avoid some of the odd dynamics that the
FCA's structure has created.2 99
A whistleblower choosing to file a qui tam suit would have to establish
that he "voluntarily" provided "original" information to the SEC related to
the alleged fraud, and is not otherwise ineligible to recover a bounty, as
these concepts are currently defined under WBP rules. 30 0 If multiple
whistleblowers submitted tips and filed qui tam suits related to the same
fraud, their suits would be consolidated in a single jurisdiction, and the
court would choose who among the plaintiffs that meet this criteria should
serve as the lead plaintiff, based on factors such as the relative importance
of the information they provided and their ability to effectively litigate the
suit.
Congress would have to decide who can raise challenges related to the
voluntariness, originality, and eligibility requirements. If defendants were
permitted to do so, it might predictably result in protracted litigation on
these preliminary issues. Moreover, it would preclude whistleblowers from
filing a qui tam complaint anonymously-in most cases defendants would
be unable to challenge these issues without access to information about the
whistleblower's identity. 30' An alternative would be to allow only the SEC
in on the appropriateness of the settlement, as I suggest below. See infra text accompanying note 304..
The SEC might use its influence to convince courts that settlements releasing culpable individual
defendants should not be approved without meaningful personal contributions. See infra note 308
(noting that the SEC could be given the right to intervene at the settlement or judgment phase for the
limited purpose of requesting nonmonetary relief against individual defendants).
299 As noted above, a decision by the DOJ to intervene in a qui tam suit typically ensures its
success, whereas non-intervention has the opposite result. See supra note 295. Although these divergent
case outcomes could simply mean that the DOJ is good at picking high-merit qui tam cases to associate
itself with, it is also possible that DOJ intervention itself influences case outcomes-for example, by
exerting unique settlement pressures on defendants. See Engstrom, supra note 292, at 1712-13
(discussing various hypotheses). If a decision to intervene does influence case outcomes, it gives the
DOJ the power to bestow favors on particular relators and their counsel. This may explain statistically
significant findings by Professor David Engstrom that FCA relators who are represented by former DOJ
attorneys have a higher likelihood of earning DOJ intervention (although other explanations are of
course possible). See Engstrom, supra note 286, at 1314. The structure proposed here would eliminate
this particular rent-seeking opportunity.
300 See supra Part II.A.1-2.
3o' The constitutionality of allowing qui tam plaintiffs to remain anonymous is beyond the scope of
this Article, but for an introduction to the issue, see United States ex rel. Doe v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
No. 4:07-CV-2467, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59390, at *4-13 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2009), for a discussion
of case law governing when a relator may keep their identity confidential after an FCA case is unsealed.
Other constitutional questions that may be raised by my proposal are also outside the scope of this
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to raise such challenges. This would not be unprecedented: Congress
recently amended the FCA to provide that a qui tam suit cannot be
dismissed on the ground that the relator is not the original source of the
allegations if the DOJ objects. 302 Another potentially better option would
be to push the issue entirely inside the agency, requiring whistleblowers to
obtain a letter of standing from the SEC prior to filing suit. At the very
least, the court should be required to consider the SEC's views on the
whistleblower's eligibilty.
To state a claim, a whistleblower would have to plead a Rule 1Ob-5
violation in accordance with the PSLRA's heightened pleading standards
and subject to the PSLRA's discovery stay. 303 The whistleblower would
not, however, have to plead or prove reliance, loss causation, or damages-
elements that do not apply in Rule 1 Ob-5 cases initiated by the government.
The whistleblower plaintiff could seek the same monetary sanctions and
disgorgement as the SEC is entitled to seek, though before ordering any
relief, the court would be instructed to solicit the views of the SEC. It
would likewise be instructed to solicit the SEC's views before approving
any settlement agreement, and such agreements would have to set forth the
factual basis for the alleged wrongdoing and be public (with the exception
of the whistleblower's identity). This would help to police against collusive
settlements and more generally serve to maximize the informational benefit
of the litigation to investors.30
When a plaintiff succeeds in obtaining monetary relief, the court,
again with input from the SEC, would be responsible for determining the
percentage of that relief that should be paid as a bounty to the plaintiff (or
plaintiffs, if multiple whistleblowers joined the suit) within a
predetermined range. The range should be set higher than the 10%-30%
range currently available under the WBP to account for the additional costs
associated with bringing the litigation.305 The criteria that should guide the
Article, but for a good introduction to the Article III standing issues raised by qui tam litigation, see
Fisch, supra note 289, at 186-94.
302 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat.
119, 901-02 (amended 2010).
303 As noted infra, this is important because the SEC's decision to allow qui tam litigation may not
involve a substantial merits-screening function. See text accompanying note 323. Others have similarly
advocated for PSLRA-style restrictions in qui tam litigation. See Bucy, supra note 278, at 68; Favro,
supra note 253, at 40-41.
3 See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
30s Professor Engstrom warns that the tiered bounty system under the FCA creates "strong
disincentives for DOJ to fully delegate enforcement authority to capable and well-resourced private
enforcers," leading to higher than optimal intervention rates. Engstrom, supra note 292, at 1752. As
discussed above, under the regime I envision, the SEC would not have an intervention option; it would
either pursue an enforcement action itself or cede the litigation to the whistleblower. See supra note 299
and accompanying text. I suspect that differentials in bounty payments would not be significant enough
to influence this choice.
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court's determination should mirror the criteria already used in the WBP
for determining whistleblower bounties but with additional factors that take
into account the whistleblower's litigation efforts.
This sketch admittedly leaves many important details to be worked
out. But my goal here is not to provide a comprehensive treatment of the
complicated design choices inherent in the creation of a WBP qui tam
provision; rather, it is simply to provide enough context to allow the reader
to evaluate the advantages of a qui tam approach relative to FOTM class
actions-the topic we turn to next.306
B. Why It Would Be Better than the Status Quo
Those who worry that the WBP will not capture the fraud detection
benefits FOTM suits produce due to expected failures in the program's
administration might not endorse the outright elimination of private Rule
1Ob-5 enforcement. But they should support a proposal that would replace
FOTM suits with a WBP qui tam provision similar to the one described
above.
First, adding a qui tam feature to the WBP would help to sustain the
program even if the SEC proved grossly incapable of sorting through
whistleblower tips. It would ensure that tips not actively being pursued by
the SEC, or affirmatively judged thereby to be insubstantial, could be
pursued in private litigation by eligible whistleblowers, and thereby
publicly exposed. Having this option would, in turn, strengthen
whistleblowers' ex ante incentives to report by affording them greater
control over their probability of recovery. For similar reasons, the qui tam
option would make whistleblower representation more attractive, thus
aiding in the development of a robust whistleblower bar-which, as
discussed above, might have the laudable effect of helping the SEC in its
administration of the WBP.
Second, replacing FOTM suits with a WBP qui tam regime would
offer several important advantages over the status quo. Like FOTM suits
today, qui tam litigation under the WBP would likely result primarily in the
imposition of corporate liability.307 This is not necessarily a bad thing: one
306 Future research focused on the design of a WBP qui tam provision would do well to draw
insights from the burgeoning empirical scholarship that is being done in the FCA context. See, e.g.,
Engstrom, supra note 286; Engstrom, supra note 292. Insights can also be drawn from state-level
experiments with qui tam-style litigation. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam
Actions as a State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203 (2013)
(discussing the California Private Attorneys General Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 (West
2011)). Adding a qui tam provision to the WBP also raises a variety of difficult constitutional questions
that warrant additional study. See supra note 301.
307 See Favro, supra note 253, at 13 ("[A]llowing qui tam actions would lead relators to pursue
actions against the firm-the entity most able to pay any imposed fine or settlement. . . .").
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might prefer that the pursuit of individual defendants be left to the
government, both because exclusive government enforcement would be
less likely to overdeter honest but risk-averse corporate officers, and
because the government is capable of imposing nonmonetary sanctions on
individuals that are useful for deterrence but are not (and should not be)
available to private enforcers.30 s But the fact that a WBP qui tam regime
would be primarily a regime of corporate liability means that its social
function would be limited in the same way as FOTM suits: its value would
derive less from the sanctions it imposes than from the information it
produces and the disciplining influence it might exert on the SEC.3 09 The
qui tam regime I propose above is far better tailored to achieve these twin
goals than are FOTM suits.
Most importantly, the envisioned qui tam regime would reward private
enforcers only when they produce an actual informational benefit. Only
individuals who volunteer original information about securities fraud
would be entitled to bring suit; socially useless private suits that merely
parrot information already in the public domain would therefore be
barred.31 o Moreover, inefficiencies that result when corporations are forced
to defend dual-track litigation would be eliminated: under the envisioned
regime, either the SEC would pursue litigation, or whistleblowers would,
but never both. This would not only save resources, but also might have the
effect of changing the litigation dynamic in healthy ways. For example,
without the threat of a parallel class action, companies might be more
308 As noted previously, attempts by corporate defendants in WBP qui tam cases to negotiate broad
liability releases for culpable individual defendants who do not contribute meaningfully to settlement
payments could be policed by the SEC and the courts. See supra note 298. But even if individual
defendants were released from civil liability in a WBP qui tam case without being made to pay, it would
not preclude criminal prosecution against egregious offenders. Another way to help ensure that culpable
individuals are meaningfully sanctioned in WBP qui tam cases would be to grant the SEC a limited
right to intervene solely to seek nonmonetary remedies against individual defendants, such as officer
and director bars, although the ways in which such a right might affect settlement dynamics would need
to be given further thought.
3 In this way WBP qui tam cases would differ from FCA cases; in FCA cases corporate cost
internalization remains a relevant goal, rendering sanction imposition independently desirable. Sanction
imposition may also remain important in securities fraud cases involving primary offerings and those
involving controlled companies. These cases also implicate compensatory values not at stake in FOTM
suits. Policymakers may therefore want to carve such cases out of the general prohibition on Rule 1Ob-5
class actions that I advocate here, although such a carve-out would present difficult line-drawing
problems and may be unnecessary given alternative remedies available to investors under section 11 of
Securities Act of 1933 and state corporate law, respectively.
310 See Fisch, supra note 289, at 201 (observing that because FCA relators "often ha[ve] unique
information about the case," they are able to "contribute to the government's ability to enforce the law
in a way that is unlikely to exist" in securities fraud class actions); Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note
289, at 97 (noting that "[i]nstead of 'junk lawsuits' filed after earnings restatements, [qui-tam style]
securities fraud actions would more likely be based on new information, thereby enhancing market
efficiency").
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willing both to go to trial against the SEC to prove no wrongdoing occurred
and to enter into settlement agreements in which they admit that it did.3 " In
either case, market participants would end up understanding more about the
firm's governance record.312 A qui tam regime would also obviate the need
for expensive litigation over issues that are not essential to the deterrence
mission but remain part of the FOTM suit for historical reasons, such as
class certification, reliance, loss causation, and the estimation of out-of-
pocket damages. Furthermore, because the SEC would be served with all
qui tam pleadings and have the opportunity to make its views known to the
court, it would stand in a better position to monitor and influence the effect
of private litigation on the development of fraud standards. 3 14
A WBP qui tam regime would also do a better job of disciplining the
SEC than do FOTM class actions. As noted above, a qui tam option would
make whistleblowing more lucrative, helping to ensure that whistleblowers
emerge, as well as lawyers to represent them. These parties would have a
direct financial incentive to monitor SEC investigations and enforcement
actions related to their tips, and to alert Congress or the media if the SEC
failed to act aggressively enough. Qui tam litigation would also provide a
cleaner benchmark against which the public might evaluate the SEC's
enforcement performance. The SEC could be required to augment the
congressional reports already required under the WBP with detailed
information about qui tam litigation and the SEC's decisions to allow or
forbid it. That information would make more transparent how extensively
the SEC is relying on private parties to supplement its fraud enforcement
efforts.3 15 By aligning the proof requirements in SEC and private Rule
311 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
312 See also Fisch, supra note 289, at 198-200 (discussing a variety of inefficiencies that would be
eliminated if a mechanism for coordinating enforcement efforts by the SEC and the private bar existed).
313 See supra Part LA (discussing how Rule lOb-5 class actions have become unmoored from their
common law origins).
314 See Engstrom, supra note 60, at 638 (discussing how unrestrained profit-driven private
enforcement can yield "a form of statutory drift and mission creep as private enforcers drive law
enforcement efforts in new and democratically unaccountable directions").
3 To be sure, increased transparency could also produce undesirable results if it pushes the SEC to
"maximize objective and observable measures of enforcement success, such as total monetary
recoveries, over harder-to-quantify and empirically contestable goals such as total illegal activity
deterred or aggregate welfare gains." Engstrom, supra note 60, at 681. This problem may already exist
at the SEC, however, and warrants independent solutions. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal
Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
542 (2013) (finding empirical support for the hypothesis that the SEC pursued more marginal
investigations into options backdating as the media frenzy surrounding that scandal persisted, at the
expense of pursuing other more egregious securities law violations); James Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DuKE L.J. 737, 778 (2003) (empirical study of
SEC enforcement actions finding evidence "consistent with the hypothesis that the SEC, at least during
the sample period, preferred weak opponents"); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing
the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 646 (2010) ("The focus
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1 Ob-5 litigation, the envisioned qui tam regime would also allow for a more
apples-to-apples comparison of case outcomes.316
Replacing FOTM suits with qui tam litigation could also have the
positive effect of encouraging greater corporate self-policing and
cooperation. As discussed in Part I.B.2.a, the threat of strict corporate
liability in a FOTM suit may dissuade boards from engaging in self-
policing efforts or from otherwise fully cooperating with an SEC
investigation. The WBP already makes self-policing more attractive: faced
with an increased likelihood that whistleblowers will report frauds to the
SEC, boards have stronger incentives to discover and report misconduct
promptly, obtaining whatever leniency they can for their firms, from both
the SEC and the market. But the threat of strict corporate liability in a
FOTM suit continues to create countervailing incentives. Replacing FOTM
suits with qui tam litigation would change this dynamic (as would, of
course, getting rid of private enforcement entirely). The elimination of
dual-track litigation would mean that the leniency the SEC could bestow on
a deserving corporation would be more potent. For example, the SEC might
choose to pursue relief only against the corporate officers responsible for
the fraud if the firm could demonstrate reasonable policing efforts, barring
any private Rule 1Ob-5 litigation against the corporation;" or, if individual
sanctions would fail to generate bounties sufficient to encourage future tips,
the SEC might choose to impose fairly modest sanctions on the corporation
and allow them to be paid through insurance.
To be sure, some may view this increased SEC leverage as
problematic. The SEC could abuse its power, downplaying misconduct by
favored defendants by charging them with lesser offenses, or worse yet
taking no enforcement action at all related to a valid tip while
simultaneously barring qui tam litigation. But this critique ignores the
disciplining influences discussed above and is based on a view of the SEC
as a corrupt agency that most knowledgeable observers reject.31 It is worth
noting, however, that there is no evidence that the DOJ has abused its
authority to terminate qui tam litigation under the FCA to favor particular
defendants.319 In fact, the problem is quite the opposite: the DOJ essentially
is on the number of cases brought by the Division, and, to a lesser extent, on the size of the fines
collected by the SEC.").
316 The alignment would not be perfect, however, due to the continued applicability of the PSLRA's
pleading standards. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
3 This would comport with Professor Arlen's recommendations. See supra note 269 and
accompanying text.
318 See supra note 285.
319 But cf Engstrom, supra note 292, at 1730-31, 1735 (finding intervention is less likely if the
defendant is a Fortune 100 company or a top defense contractor).
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never exercises its termination right.320 As Professor David Engstrom has
explained, a variety of bureaucratic pathologies could explain this,
including a fear by agency officials that "subsequent events may turn up
evidence of wrongdoing, thus embarrassing the agency," coupled with the
realization that "the actual and reputational costs of terminating bad
lawsuits can be reliably shifted to the judiciary." 321 Underutilization rather
than overutilization of the termination right is a much more likely scenario
in the WBP qui tam context, as well. Indeed, my expectation is that except
in rare cases where the tip is obviously frivolous, the right to sue would be
granted if the SEC did not itself launch an investigation.322 Thus, I do not
expect the SEC's decision to permit qui tam litigation to encompass much
of a merits screening function (which is why I recommend preserving the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standards and discovery stay).
Coupling the elimination of FOTM suits with the addition of a qui tam
provision to the WBP has one final, practical benefit to recommend it: it
should be far more politically palatable than would be a proposal to abolish
private enforcement altogether. Congress could counter charges that the
reform will sacrifice fraud deterrence with persuasive arguments that the
reform will, in fact, strengthen fraud deterrence. While resistance to the
proposal by the powerful class action bar should be expected, it should be
less intense than the resistance a proposal to eliminate all private Rule
1Ob-5 enforcement would provoke-Rule 1Ob-5 class actions lawyers
could, after all, adjust to the new system by becoming WBP whistleblower
counsel. The idea also finds support in the scholarly literature,324 and its
implementation would be relatively straightforward. Although numerous
additional details would need to be worked out, the sketch I provide shows
how the program could build on the substantial existing legal infrastructure
created around the WBP and FOTM class actions.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that adopting a qui tam provision to
replace FOTM suits is necessarily better than eliminating private Rule
1Ob-5 enforcement altogether (assuming the latter option were politically
feasible). The WBP may work effectively without qui tam litigation, or qui
320 Id. at 1717.
321 Engstrom, supra note 60, at 682-83.
322 Prompt self-reporting by a firm would hopefully cause the SEC to launch its own investigation,
leading it to preclude qui tam whistleblower litigation.
323 Designing the qui tam mechanism in such a way as to encourage merits screening would
certainly be desirable, however, and is not necessarily a hopeless cause. See, e.g, Engstrom, supra note
292, at 1749 (suggesting that the government be held liable for a prevailing defendant's fees or be
required to provide qui tam plaintiffs with a minimum recovery in order to induce desired levels of case
termination); Rose, supra note 41, at 1358 (discussing reason-giving as one way to protect against
arbitrary or biased decisions).
324 See supra note 289; see also Engstrom, supra note 60; Stephenson, supra note 41.
1299
108:1235 (2014)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tam litigation may be a cure far worse than the disease (the FCA's qui tam
provision is highly controversial, and many think that its costs exceed its
benefits). It is also possible that a totally different set of reforms would do
better to promote optimal deterrence.325 I am making the more limited point
that, if preserving private Rule 1 Ob-5 enforcement is desirable, adding a qui
tam provision to the WBP would be preferable to retaining FOTM suits.
Importantly, the WBP qui tam provision that I envision would not extend to
any securities law violations except for violations of Rule lOb-5; thus, it
would not create private enforcement where none exists today.
CONCLUSION
Although much has been written about the SEC's new Whistleblower
Bounty Program, this Article is the first to consider the program's impact
on the longstanding debate over fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) class actions.
The analysis demonstrates that the program has profound implications for
that debate. If the bounty program succeeds, it will replicate the fraud
detection benefits of FOTM class actions while simultaneously increasing
their costs-rendering them a pointless yet expensive redundancy. If the
SEC proves incapable of effectively administering the bounty program,
amending it to include a qui tam provision for Rule 1 Ob-5 violations would
offer several advantages over retaining FOTM class actions. Either way,
the bounty program has implications for FOTM suits that policymakers
should not ignore.
325 See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1899 (2007) (arguing for a limited exception to
insider trading liability that would allow for short-selling on negative inside information). Some may
even prefer that the WBP fail. If one believes that financially incentivizing employees to "snitch" on
their coworkers is a bad idea to begin with, one will oppose shoring up those incentives through the
creation of a WBP qui tam provision. As discussed in Part III.A, an insider with knowledge of fraud
would have stronger incentives to participate in a well-run WBP than to serve as a confidential
informant in a FOTM suit. But the relative inferiority of FOTM suits in detecting fraud is an odd
justification for their retention. A better solution for people of this mindset might be to modify the WBP
so that only outsiders could participate, or to adopt the proposal advanced by Professors Casey and
Niblett. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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